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Abstract

The security problem has gained increasing awareness due to the various kinds of global
threats. Security analytics is the process of using streaming data acquisition, collection,
and artificial intelligence algorithms for security monitoring and threat disclosure. In this
dissertation work, we utilize practical data-driven security analytics to identify the potential
threat and explore the robustness of the machine learning model. We focus on two aspects:
(1) Security Analytics: utilize machine learning and statistical analytics tools to identify
and resolve the threat in real life, such as cybersecurity, abnormal activities. (2) Analytic
Security: Explore the security issues of the machine learning model itself, which increases
the robustness of classifiers and prevents the potential threat from adversarial attacks.
In the first part, we demonstrate case studies in solving the security problem of categorical classification and time-series abnormal detection. In the proposed framework, we
handle the incoming data by utilizing the transfer learning technique to improve detection
efficiency and accuracy. Our model could allow the small-sized datasets take advantages
of large amounts dataset by using the high-level representative features, since this can help
the traditional machine learning classifiers to reduce the prediction time and enhance the
detection accuracy with it.
In the second part, we focus on the security problem of the machine learning model
itself: threats of the adversarial examples. The adversarial example generates through
the trained classifier, which utilizes the classifier’s gradient information and prediction results. It’s hard to distinguish the difference between adversarial examples from the original
data from human perception; however, the adversarial examples could fool the well-trained
classifier to get the wrong prediction easily. For adversarial attack, we proposed two attack
algorithms: superpixel attack and border attack, which trick the classifier with high confidence. The attack algorithm reveals the truth that machine learning classifiers and deep
learning networks (DNNs) need defensive procedures to improve the robustness since the

xiv

state-of-the-art models are widely applied in daily activities. These extensive deep learning
applications are facing the crucial security problems, especially for computer vision, voice
translation, and text mining, etc. To further improve the robustness of DNNs, we develop
a novel adversarial defense framework utilizing the hidden layer representations statistical
signature to detect the adversarial examples. Our proposed method could identify potential
threat data with light computation cost - without the knowledge of the corresponding adversarial attack algorithm. This meaningful work builds a barrier for DNNs naturally and
efficiently, which could identify various kinds of adversarial examples without data feature
transformation and extra training a detection model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The security has gained increasing awareness due to the various kinds of global threats.
The physical world and cyberspace both face the Imperceptible risk every day. The global
statistic shows there are 2.77 billion social media users and 26.66 billion connected Internet
of Things (IoT) in 2019. Also, the new generations are native in the Internet world, with the
convenience of lifestyle, the security threat will encounter more often than ever. There are
over 800 data breaches were disclosed in 2018. Each new breach raises fears that trust in the
global digital economy is ending [1]. Not only the privacy information protection meet the
challenge but also the media credibility face the fake text and image issues. The advanced
generative adversarial networks (GANs) could generate fake news, faces, voices which
extremely hard for the human to identify truth. In the physical world, the adversarial attack
could be a disaster for the computer vision drive business. The Tencent Keen Security Lab
published their research demonstration last month that they attack the Tesla Autopilot in
two data-driven ways. Display an adversarial image in from the Tesla could active the auto
wipe even not in the raining environment and the interference stickers on the road mislead
the auto-drive Tesla drive into reverse lane [2]. Therefore, deploying the security analytics
system to counter the threat grows to an inevitable trend.
The definition of “Security Analytics” is not well explained by the official dictionary.
There are few books and research papers mention the term when practical data science utilized to solve the security issue [3]. Ilze Birzniece summarized the meaning of ”Security
Analytics” from current literature and classified the multifacet knowledge into three categories: cyber threat analysis, addressing security issues beyond the cyberspace and analysis
threats in machine learning [4]. This research emphasizes on security analytics in data science domain practical application. Utilize the data-driven method to counter potential risks
1

and improve the robustness of state-of-the-art neural network models.
The data-driven security analytics defense framework implements to detect the potential
threat in the Internet of Things (IoT) context. Most IoT elopements don’t contain enough
computation powers to train the model from a substantial amount of dataset. The general
methodology of the solution arises in three steps:
• Trained a substantial amount of data in the deep learning model.
• Develop the best deep learning architecture, which reaches the highest evaluation
standard. Remove the output layer and utilize it as a pretrained model for feature
extractor.
• Fine-tune the classifiers in IoT equipment by using the new dataset. The new dataset
could be similar to the original dataset or slightly different.
From the data science aspect, the structured data and time series data are most common
in most of the tasks. This proposed framework will handle these two kinds of data to
eliminate the threat.

1.1

Machine Learning Approaches in Security Analytics

Cyberattack is a critical problem at the time of Internet of Things(IoT). The research from
CSO shows cybercrime damage costs to beat 6 trillion dollars annually by 2021, and the
average time for intrusion detection has increased from 57.4 days to 93.2 days in last three
years [5]. This paper builds an architecture to prevent the cyberattack in the context of increasing “smart city”. Incorporating novel technologies and artificial intelligence, the cities
are becoming faster connectivity to optimize resources rapidly in recent years. The “smart
city” is defined as using technology to improve city services and provide a high quality
of life for residents [6]. Based on the report from Navigant Research, the global market
for the smart city is worth 40.1 billion dollars in 2017 and with growth expected to approach a mountainous 97.9 billion dollars by 2026[7]. San Diego officials replace 14, 000
2

streetlights with LED lights and 3, 200 sensors, which will collect city data from real-time
traffic, pedestrian or air quality. The data will empower the freight transportation around
the congestion and notify the drivers about the vacant parking spaces as they become available[7]. However, advanced technologies are under the threat of network intrusion from
different aspects. The security and privacy of smart cities’ data and information are critical
challenges due to the complicated security maturity. In the last ten years, the cyberattacks
triggered the irreversible damage to our society. In 2013, different groups of hackers compromised 1 billion Yahoo accounts. In 2014, there were 145 million eBay users under
cyberattacks. In 2017, the cyber instruction got 143 million consumers personal information from Equifax [8]. The damage from cyberattacks never stopped. However, protecting
security in the smart city indicates protecting streaming data flow and system from any malicious activity, which needs the costly budget in a long process for public or private sectors
[9]. The challenge from cybersecurity not only need the exponential growth in data from
IoT but also need an architecture to systematically real-time detect potential threats.

To counter cyberattack in the modern IoT environment, it is critical to strengthening
the identification of cyber threats through executing prompt countermeasures to block the
potential risks. Currently, there are some approaches proposed to detect and prevent cyber
instructions in a different environment. The Ibrahimi [10] use Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce data dimensions to detect
intrusions, the Özçelik [11] Ghanem [12] Papamartzivanos [13] applied supervised machine learning algorithms, Al-Zewairi [14] Wang Gang [15] Idhammad [16] deployed the
neural networks to solve the problem. The existing method could detect cyberattacks with
high accuracy on the diverse attack types. However, they barely consider the training time
for the massive scale of a dataset. This research proposes a novel architecture called Deep
Feature Embedding Learning (DFEL). This methodology can reduce the data dimensions
by taking the edge of deep learning and transfer learning. It also decreases the training
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time significantly and outperforms other machine learning algorithms concerning detection accuracy. DFEL can systematically reduce the data dimension by an algorithm 1 by
which the user can balance the training speed and detection performance of the classifier.
Compared with the traditional machine learning methods, the deep learning approach can
take advantage of the big data. The fundamental idea of DFEL is to use the mass amount
of data to generate high-level features and apply the pretrained model to boost the detecting speed of traditional machine learning algorithms. Real data experiments show that the
DFEL outperforms other up-to-date algorithms when being used on NSL-KDD dataset and
UNSW-NB15 dataset. With experiments on the NSL-KDD dataset, the DFEL profoundly
improved the Gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes classifier’s recall level from 80.74% to 98.79% and
significantly reduced all classifiers’ running time, especially the support vector machine,
prediction time from 67.26 seconds to 6.3 seconds. With experiments on the UNSW-NB15
dataset DFEL also discover the critical nonlinear relationships in the data and can help
the machine learning algorithms improve performance concerning accuracy and detection
time.

1.2

Security issues of Machine Learning

The critical domain of machine learning, Deep learning, considered as a significant approach toward artificial intelligence which the computational models that are composed
of multiple processing layers to learn representations of data with multiple levels of abstraction [17]. The state-of-the-art models dramatically improve the performance of realtime objective detection[18],controlling continuous systems in robotics[19], speech recognition[20] and natural language processing[21]. With notable progress and successful applications in various fields, deep learning becomes a vital role in machine learning and
artificial intelligence, especially the problems related to complex and big data. The selfdriving car [22] demonstrated excellent performance in diverse conditions. The advanced
deep learning model could predict the patients’ risk of lung cancer (94.4% area under the
4

curve) based on current and previous computed tomography volumes [23]. The human activities can be well recognized through camera sensors [24]. The Alpha zero achieves the
superhuman level of play in games of chess and shogi as well as Go with 24 hours training
[25]. The automatic language translation boosted the capability through transfer learning
and zero-shot method[26]. With the continuous success in various applications, the openaccess in deep learning modules and cloud computing platforms provided the solution of
the data storage and the computation power issues [27]. The complicated computer vision and natural language models could be easily implemented in the business through the
platform’s pre-trained models with high performance [28].
Despite the continuously improved accuracy and computing efficiency in various network models, Szegedy et al. first found the hardly perceptible perturbation can misclassify
an image through maximizing the stat-of-the-art network prediction error [29]. The perturbation image generated by adversarial attacks and the perturbed image called adversarial
example. The high classification accuracy deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In addition, the same perturbation can cause multiple neuron networks to
misclassify the same input.
The extensive deep learning application may face a crucial security problem, especially
for the computer vision domain. Recent research indicated that adversarial attacks are feasible in the physical world. For instance, the printed adversarial patch successfully hide the
person from human detector surveillance camera [30]. The work also suggested other similar object detectors might be vulnerable to this kind of attack. The Tencent Keen Security
Lab published their research demonstrated that they attack the Tesla Autopilot in two datadriven ways. Display an adversarial image in from the Tesla could active the auto wipe
even not in the raining environment and the interference stickers on the road mislead the
auto-drive Tesla drive into reverse lane [2]. Furthermore, the generated robust physically
realizable adversarial perturbations on stop sign mislead the classifiers recognized as speed
limit 45 [31].

5

On the other hand, inspect the fundamental reason caused by adversarial attacks may
bring us more insight of the neuron networks model, since the deep learning still considered
as black-box [32]. The state-of-the-art deep learning models often achieve human-level
performance (or better) on image recognition tasks, but these methods do not yet truly
understand the tasks as human brain [33]. Explore the intrinsic deficiencies in the training procedure [34] or problematic decision boundary [35]; the adversarial research could
improve the robustness of deep learning.

6

CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORKS

This chapter, we demonstrate the related research in security analytics and analytics security. The security analytics focus on the cyberattack and human activities detection. The
analytics security emphasis on the adversarial attacks and defenses.

2.1

Defense the Cyberattack

There has been abundant literature dealing with cyberattacks detection. Timčenko in [36]
compared the ensemble machine learning methods for unbalanced datasets test and indicated the Bagged tree and GentleBoost perform higher accuracy and ROC values than other
tree-related values. The Ibrahimi in [10] shows that PCA has high efficiency to discriminate the cyberattacks and standard internet request on KDD-99 and NSL-KDD dataset.
Also, the experimental results presented the defect of LDA which has some poor precisely
at the level of computations of the covariance matrix. The Özçelik’s apply [11] cumulative
sum entropy detection to filter the Denial of Service attacks which are an essential problem
for the communication systems. The results displayed a high detection accuracy and a low
false positive rate. Moreover, the results beat the performances from other detection methods utilizing the entropy of packet header field. In [12], Ghanem implemented Support
Vector Machine (SVM) approach, which is a Machine Learning (ML) method and could
complement the performance of intrusion detection systems as well as decrease the number of false alarms. Papamartzivanos [13] created a novel methodology for generating new
detection rules which could classify both common and rare types of attacks. The performance of the DFEL method outperforms other common ML methods using the KDD-99
and NSL-KDD datasets but still needs to improve on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, which is
more complicated and reflects the modern internet traffic [37].
7

Deep learning, which has an incredible power to handle image and text data, is evolving extremely fast in recent years. Al-Zewairi [14] applied the Gedeon method to select
top 15% essential features and deployed deep learning binomial classifier to detect intrusion. Wang Gang [15] applied the fuzzy clustering technique to generate different training
subsets. As a result, training different neural networks on different training subsets could
outperform some traditional machine learning algorithms such as decision tree and Naive
Bayes. Idhammad [16] utilized unsupervised Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS)
to choose relevant features and built a Feed-forward Neural Network to distinguish the
DoS traffic and normal traffic. These research obtained high intrusion detection efficiencies. However, they rarely mentioned the balance between training time and performance.
DFEL can significantly reduce the detection time as well as allow the traditional machine
learning algorithms take the benefits from big data. Also, DFEL diminishes the data dimension by the algorithm 1 which determines the size of encoding latent variables.

2.2

Abnormal Activity Identification

The problem of physical activity recognition using embedding sensors has extensively researched and applied in different domains for many years. Nowadays, with the development of artificial intelligence (AI), some studies analyze the sensor data using machine
learning tools [38]. Weihao Cheng et al. devised Weighted Min-max Activity Recognition Model to predicts the current activity by partitioning the observed time series window
frame. The method could handle the arbitrary number of activities without prior knowledge [39]. The adaptive sampling and learning outstanding detected the least number of
instances in human activity dataset [40]. In [41], Tang considers the human activity data as
dynamic activities, static postures, and postural transitions. And the K-Nearest Neighbors
algorithm perform the best accuracy. Almaslukh et al. utilized the stacked autoencoder to
improve recognition accuracy and significantly reduce recognition time [42]. The research
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in [43] improved activity recognition accuracy by using generic feature engineering method
to select the robust variables. Similarly, Berradi applied the autoencoder unsupervised neural networks to extract the features of activity sensory signals and enhance the accuracy of
classifiers [44] . Kachuee et al. deployed denoising autoencoders and sensitivity analysis in
neural networks to efficiently query the unknown features in the given context [45]. Wang
applied SVM in a device free environment to detect fall activity for a single person with
high accuracy [46]. In [47], the authors proposed a fixed-point arithmetic SVM to gain a
better activity recognition performance and reduce the battery consumptions. The study
in [48] utilized an incremental ensemble SVM significantly reduce the algorithm running
time on physical activity recognition data. Brito et al. proposed neural network architectures with optimal features through Particle Swarm Optimization. The algorithm designed
for subset features and build the best model architecture through trial and error process
[49].

2.3

Adversarial Machine Learning

The security issue of deep neural network has become a critical problem [50]. The Szegedy
et al. first proposed to utilize the sensitivity to craft the adversarial image through gradient
based algorithm to find the weakness of neural network [51]. The gradient-based attack
is efficiency and intuitive The Goodfellow et al. designed the fatst gradient sigh method
for generating the effective adversarial images. The algorithm is based on the hypothesis
that the linearity and high dimensions of inputs cause the sensitive to perturbation [52].
In addtion, the Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed the Deepfool algorithm which ultilize
the greedy perturbation searching method through assuming the linearity of DNN decision
boundaries [53] The Madry et al. propose the method to projected gradient descent attack
with random start [35]. The Carlini and Wagner proposed the powerful method the break
the defensive distillation. The method iterative generate adversarial image by minimize the
p-norm distance and employ an function to encourage the target/non-target misclassifica9

tion [54]. Dong et al. integrated the interactive gradient sign method with an momentum
term which escape from poor local maxima during the iterations [55]. Papernot et al. utilize
Jacobian matrix to construct “Adversarial Saliency Map” which produce adversarial samples inducing a certain behavior from the deep neural network [56]. The score-based attack
often related to black-box/semi-black-box attack. The Su et al. proposed the one pixel attack method which only change one or few pixels to fool the machine learning through an
differential evolution algorithm. The Narodytska et al. propose the gready search method
which carefully constructing a small set of pixels to perturb the data distribution [57]. Some
new research focus on the decision-based attack. The Brendel et al. proposed the boundary, a decision-based attack that start from a large adversarial perturbations and reduce the
perturbation while still stay adversarial [58]. The Engstrom et al. claimed that the neural
network are vulnerable to the natural image transformation and rotation [59]. The Schott
et al. proposed the point-wise attack. It first add salt-and-pepper noise until the data misclassification. Then iterative remove the perturbation and still stay adversarial [60].

The adversarial defense is also widely researched although there is no one-shoot solution for all the attacks. Gu et al. utilize the trained denoising autoencoder as preprocess
step before apply data to the classifier [61]. The Papernotet al. [62] proposed distillation as
a Defense method to prevent the Adversarial Perturbations and improve the robustness of
deep neural network which inspired by the work from Hintonet al [63]. This method is also
one of the benchmarks to test adversarial attack effectiveness. Samangouei et al. proposed
the generative adversarial network as a countermeasure for adversarial perturbationset al
[64]. The Liao et al. construct the learning image from high level feature increase the security level of neural network [65]. The Xu et al. propose the feature squeezing method to
reduce the search space available for an adversary by coalescing samples[66]. The Schott et
al. presented a novel robust classification model that performs analysis by synthesis using
learned class-conditional data distributions. [60]
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CHAPTER 3
CATEGORICAL SECURITY ANALYTICS

This chapter presented the cyberattack defense methodology: Deep Feature Embedding
Learning (DFEL) in 3.1. The DFEL utilized in the well known public dataset and the
experiment result demonstrated in 3.2

3.1

Deep Feature Embedding Learning

Deep Learning is a subset of machine learning that consists of supervised and unsupervised learning techniques, and it bases on many layers of artificial neural networks. Each
layer contains some neurons with activation functions that are used to produce non-linear
outputs. The methodology inspired by the biological neuron structure of the brain, but it’s
loosely related to information processing and communication patterns in a natural nervous
system. Deep Learning algorithms derive significant abstract representations from the raw
data through the use of a hierarchical multi-level learning approach. Features from the
higher-level are more abstract and complicated and they based on the less abstract concepts. They are representatives of the features in the lower level of the learning hierarchy
[67]. Therefore, the complicated and high-level representatives are valuable as inputs to a
supervised predictor [68].
The DFEL method was motivated by these previous researchers as well as by the recent successful implementations of transfer learning in visual categorization [69] and word
embedding text analysis [70]. Figure 3.1 shows the DFEL architecture, which consists of
tree stage. In the 3.1.1 needs to set the control value (from 0 to 1) to balance the training speed and prediction accuracy. The 3.1.2 is training a big dataset on the defined deep
learning neural network. In the 3.1.3, pre-trained deep learning network from 3.1.2 was
used to generate embedding features for small datasets with similar distributions. On the
11
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Figure 3.1: Architecture for Deep Feature Embedding Learning (DFEL)
other hand, small-sized datasets can take the advantage from large amount dataset by using
the high-level representative features, since this can help the traditional machine learning
classifiers to reduce the prediction time and boost the detection accuracy with it.

3.1.1

Network Neuron Function

The fundamental objective of the algorithm 1 is to define the number of neurons in each of
the hidden layers of the deep neural structure. As a result, the number of neurons in the last
hidden layer can be considered as the high-level feature dimension. If the control value 

12

is close to 1, the high-level feature dimension is more close to the original data dimension.
On the other hand, the smaller value of  would generate more abstract representations.
Algorithm 1 Calculate f () = N
Require: D ≥ 1, 0 ≤  ≤ 1, N ← list
Ensure: f () = N
i ← 1 {initial i equal to 1}
l ← dD/10e assert the number of layers
while N ≤ l do
n ← 0 {initial n equal to 0}
n ← d(D/i)0.5 e {value depend on which of layer}
n ← n + d ∗ De {value control by }
N ← n {save n to the Queue N }
i ← i + 1 {move to next iteration}
end while
In the algorithm 1, D is the dimension of training dataset, l indicates the number of
layers in the Deep Learning Network. In the while loop, number of neurons calculate and
save in a list N for 3.1.2. The purpose of algorithm 1 is to determine the number of layers
by the dimension of the training dataset. he number of layer’s neurons is dcreasing from
bottom layers to top layers. The size of neurons is controlled by the user defined variable
, which aims at balancing the detection time and accuracy in 3.1.3. To evaluate how the
algorithm can effectly classify network traffic as normal or abnormal network traffic in
3.1.2 , authors have set up eleven experiments based on  from 0 to 1 increment by 0.1.
3.1.2

Training Deep Neural Network

The deep learning algorithm aims at learning the patterns from the massive amount of
dataset. In this study, the deep feed-forward neural networks were trained using the backpropagation algorithm to predict the intrusions. The number of layers and neurons have
already been defined by the algorithm 1. The activation function used for each layer is the
Leaky Rectifier activation. This non-linear function calculates the sum of all the weighted
inputs and transfers the negative values close to zero. The rectifier equation is presented
in 3.1 where the α is 0.001. Compared to the sigmoid activation function or hyperbolic
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tangent function, the leaky rectifier activation function allows a network to obtain sparse
representations as well as relief the gradient vanishing problem.

LR(x) = max(α ∗ x, x)

(3.1)

The dropout technique regularization technique is applied at each layer to prevent the
overfitting problem. Standard backpropagation learning builds up to adapt the training data
but does not generalize to unseen data. Random dropout breaks up these adaptations by
making the presence of any particular hidden unit unreliable [71]. The output layer uses
the sigmoid function to converts the real input value to the monotonical output value that
increases from 0 to 1. The output value can be used to classify the intrusion.
The function is presented as following 3.2:

S(x) =

ex
ex + 1

(3.2)

The cost function is a binary cross entropy (also called log loss) and measures the intrusion detection probability value between 0 and 1. The function is defined as the followed
equation 3.3, where the y is ground truth and ŷ is predited value, log is nature log.

arg min H(y, ŷ) = −ylog ŷ − (1 − y)log(1 − ŷ)
(3.3)
N

where ŷ = S(LR (x))
In the backpropagation part, the gradient descent method searches for the optimal global
solution that minimizes the prediction error by updating the weights. The partial derivative is calculated for each weight in the network. The learning process can be express as
equation 3.4 where the η is learning rate and t is the number of the epoch.

W (t + 1) = W (t) − η∂H(t)/∂W (t)
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(3.4)

The process of Deep learning network can be presented as algorithm 2. The number
layers l and neurons n already calculated in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 Calculate D(x) = xW + b
Require: N , η,H(y, ŷ)
Ensure: D(x) = xW + b
F orward P ropagation
Build N N with l layers and n neurons
A(x) = max(α ∗ x, x) {each layer0 s activition f uction}
Drop out {0.1 drop out af ter each layer}
x
S(x) = exe+1 {Output layer}
Backpropagation
while validation acc not improve in last 5 epoch do
W (t + 1) = W (t) − η∂H(t)/∂W (t)
end while
After training this model on a large dataset, the output layer was removed and the rest
part of the neural network was employed as the pre-trained model for feature embedding.
The number of neurons in the last layer of the deep neural network is the encoding variable
dimension.

3.1.3

Feature Embedding for Detection

Reducing data dimension with the pretrained deep neural network from 3.1.2 can work well
if the initial weights were set to close to the optimal solution. Also, this method outperforms
the PCA as a tool to reduce the dimensional of data [72]. The feature embedding for
the relatively small size stream IoT data can help classifiers to discriminate the normal
traffic and cyberattck. The size of the encoding latent variable dimension is determined
by algorithm 1. The smaller size of high-level feature can help classifiers faster detect
intrusion, however, may sacrifice the prediction accuracy. Users can balance the detection
speed and accuracy by selecting proper  value. In section 3.2, the experiment shows the
advantage of using DFEL as preprocess for traditional machine learning algorithm.
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3.2

Data Description and Experiment Evaluation

In this section, authors present the overview of the common cyberattack in IoT environment
from the attack features from two public dataset. Then compare the traditional machine
learning algorithm detection performance between original dataset and DFEL dataset.

3.2.1

Data Collection

• NSL-KDD Dataset: The dataset overcomes the weakness of KDD-99 dataset which
was widely used for evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems [73]. The original
KDD-99 dataset contains redundant records in the training dataset, so the classifiers
are more likely skewed towards the more frequent history. The cyberattack in the
datasets is falling in four categories: Denial of Service Attack (DoS), the user to
Root Attack (U2R), remote to Local Attack (R2L). And it’s more challenge to detect
intrusion using the test datasets since it contains additional more 14 attack types than
train data. The essential features extracted from the TCP/IP connection, the traffic
features are computed respect to a time window interval.

• UNSW-NB15 Dataset: This dataset created by establishing the synthetic environment at the UNSW cybersecurity lab. The data presented a hybrid of the real modern
normal and the contemporary synthesized attack activities of the network traffic [74].
The data had 47 features including new low-footprint attack scenarios and 9 significant families of the cyberattack. UNSW-NB15 is more complicated than NSL-KDD
[16]. It is helpful for the research community of network intrusion detection system
(N IDS) and can be considered as a modern N IDS benchmark data set.
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3.2.2

Evaluation Metrics

This section mainly aims at evaluating the detection time and accuracy generated by DFEL.
Authors also present the detection performance under a set of  value in algorithm 1. In
order to nominate the bests strategy for the cyberattack detection, the evaluation metrics
are essential. True positive (T P ) refer to the correct intrusion detection, and false positive
(F P ) means to consider the normal traffic as the cyberattack. True negative (T N ) corresponds to normal traffic correctly labeled as normal and false negative (F N ) refer to fail
intrusion disclosure. The experimental results are using the following performance metrics.
• Accuracy: The metric assess the percentage of the internet traffic that is correctly
classified. It is a fraction of correction detection divided by the total number of
instance in the dataset.
• Recall: This measurement reflects the classifier’s ability to detect cyberattack which
is vital in the context, also referred as sensitivity. The metric calculated as sensitivity
Recall = (T P )/(N P + T P ).
• Precision: This metric related to the classifier’s ability to pass the normal request
without condition, also referred as specificity. The metric calculated as P recision =
(T N )/(F P + T N ).
• Processing Time Change: The detection time is depend on training time and testing time. The time change (T C) defined as the fraction of classifier detection time
without DFEL (T ) minus classifier detection time after DFEL (DT ) divided by the
process time without DFEL.The metric calculated as T C = (T − DT )/(T ).

3.2.3

Experiment Result Analysis

Before evaluating the proposed model, all the categorical variable have been transferred
to dummy variables. Moreover, min-max normalization was applied on each variable to
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map the independent variable to the range (0,1). The normalization function is defined as
z = (x − min(x))/(max(x) − min(x)). The two datasets are randomly splitted using the
same rule. 80% of data was used to fit DFEL and get the pre-trained model. The remaining
20% of the data was randomly split into 70%/30% as training/testing data for classifiers.
Next, the 20% rest data was transferred to latent attributes using DFEL, and the embedding
features were split into 70%/30% for embedding training/embeding test. The accuracy
on the trained deep learning predictor on NSL-KDD test data is 94.3% and on the USNW
test data is 93.2%. Finally, the performances from traditional machine learning algorithms
were compared on embedding data and original data. In the proposed DFEL model, authors
set up eleven experiments based on  from 0 to 1 increment by 0.1 and the highest recall
for each classifier was selected.
NSL-KDD Dataset
Model
Accuracy Precision
Gradient Boosting Tree (GBT)
99.29%
99.29%
DFEL GBT ( 0.7)
98.54%
98.54%
K-nearest Neighbors (KNN)
98.56%
98.55%
DFEL KNN ( 0.7)
98.82%
98.82%
Decision Tree (DT)
90.69%
90.80%
DFEL DT ( 0.7)
98.77%
98.77%
Logistic Regression (LG)
95.74%
95.78%
DFEL LG ( 0.7)
98.85%
98.85%
Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB)
81.27%
86.42%
DFEL GNB ( 0.7)
98.80%
98.79%
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
94.89%
94.90%
DFEL SVM ( 0.7)
98.86%
98.86%

Recall
99.29%
98.53%
98.56%
98.82%
90.61%
98.77%
95.71%
98.85%
80.74%
98.79%
94.87%
98.87%

Time(s)
0.41
0.17
1.79
0.07
0.42
0.25
0.24
0.20
0.06
0.01
67.26
6.30

Table 3.1: Models Performance Comparison on NSL-KDD Dataset

The performances of the classifiers by using features from original dataset as well as
latent features generate by DFEL were compared in the tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The machine learning algorithms include gradient-boosted trees, k nearest neighbor,
decision tree, logistic regression, gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes and support vector machine. The
k nearest neighbor algorithm set five closest neighbor for query. The decision tree algorithm set the minimum split split node is two with the cirterion of Gini index. The logistic
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UNSW-NB15 Dataset
Model
Accuracy Precision
Gradient Boosting Tree (GBT)
93.13%
92.38%
DFEL GBT ( 0.7)
91.22%
90.38%
K-nearest Neighbors (KNN)
90.83%
90.06%
DFEL KNN ( 0.7)
91.90%
91.25%
Model
ACC
DFEL_ACC
tc
Decision Tree (DT)
86.94%
91.28%
BoostTree
93.13%
98.54%
65%
DFEL DT ( 0.6)
92.29%
91.24%
KNN Regression (LG)
90.83%
98.82%
97%
Logistic
89.47%
91.02%
DFEL
LG (Tree
1)
92.35%
91.50%
Decision
86.94%
98.77%
17%
Gaussian
(GNB)
50.45%
71.09%
LogisticNaive Bayes
89.47%
98.85%
48%
DFEL
NB
(
0.7)
92.52%
91.45%
GNB
50.45%
98.80%
88%
Support
Vector
Machine
(SVM)
88.89%
92.25%
SVM
88.89%
98.86%
88%
DFEL SVM ( 0.6)
92.32%
91.41%

Recall
92.84%
90.69%
90.10%
91.21%
82.03%
92.52%
86.36%
92.11%
61.18%
92.85%
84.79%
92.20%

Time(s)
0.96
0.33
5.55
0.16
0.5
0.42
0.81
0.42
0.21
0.02
634.11
74.81

Table 3.2: Models Performance Comparison on UNSW-NB15 Dataset
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Figure 3.2: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers’ ACC before and after DFEL
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most percentages of the intrusion are corrected predicted, which can effectly avoid the po-
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tential damage. The accuracy of the gradient boost tree has slightly decreased. However, it
reduced the detection time by 57.75% . After the DFEL process, the gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes
classifier’s recall level profoundly improved from 80.74% to 98.79%. The support vector
machine classifier’s detection time reduced from 67.26 seconds to 6.3 seconds. From the
accuracy and speed aspect, the DFEL help the traditional machine learning algorithms enhance their performance on NSL-KDD dataset.

The UNSW-NB15 is a more complicated dataset and it is more challenge when being
used by classifiers to predict intrusion. As the figure 3.2 shows, the DFEL discover the
critical nonlinear relationships in the data and can help the machine learning algorithms
improve performance concerning accuracy and detection time. Support vector machine
classifier could increase the recall level from 84.79% to 92.20% and save 559.3 seconds
when detecting cyberattack. The Gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes classifier’s accuracy increased
from 50.45% to 92.52% which implicated the DFEL’s high-level features represent the
original dataset attributes in a better way. The optimal  value is different than the NSLKDD dataset, so there is no generalized recommend  for classifiers and data. For UNSWNB15, the high-level feature generated by DFEL not only well extract the latent insight of
the dataset but also reduce the detection time for all classifiers.

The figure 3.3 presented the detection processing time change for each machine learning algorithm. The decision tree classifier is a fast classier which make prediction based
entropy and information gain. So the decision tree classifier doesn’t have too much room
to speed up. For the time-consuming algorithm like support vector machine and k nearest neighbor, the DFEL significantly decrease the detection time. K nearest neighbor
needs to calculate the Euclidean distance to all instances. Core of the support vector
machine is a quadratic programming problem which is complexity-wise approximately
O(n2samples ∗ nf eatures ). These high computation cost classifiers benefit from the result of
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Figure 3.3: UNSW-NB15 Classifiers’ TC after DFEL

Figure 3.4:  Effects on Accuracy
dimension reduction performed by DFEL. Furthermore, the proposed framework can also
be applied in real-time cyberattack detection.

The figures 3.4 shows how the  affect the accuracy of classifiers. The  can balance
the model performance and cyberattack detection time well. The DFEL with a lower value
of  could reduce the dimension of the data more. Therefore, the classifiers can have faster
detection time on smaller dimension data. The left apart of figure 3.4 shows the changing
of accuracy with different values of  in the NSL-KDD data. When  changes in the range 0
to 0.4, the accuracy from all the classifiers increase fast. After the 0.4 the accuracy pushes
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Figure 3.5: Comparison PCA Visualization before and after DFEL for NSL-KDD
up slowly and close to 1. The right part of figure 3.4 shows the effect of  on the model performance when using UNSW-NB15 dataset. The accuracy doesn’t have significant change
after  being above 0.2. To optimize the detection speed and don’t sacrifice the prediction
accuracy too much, the 0.2 of  value could be the best value for the intrusion detection
system.

Figure 3.5 provides a visualization by using principal component analysis (PCA) dimension reduction. The dark dots are cyberattacks instances and the light dots are normal
ones. The PC1 denotes the first principal component, which is the linear combination of
attributes that has maximum variance among all linear combinations. The PC2 is the second principal component, which is orthogonal to PC1, measures the remaining variation
as much as possible. The left part of figure 3.5 represents the data attributes in NSL-KDD
and the right part reflects the high-level features after DFEL. Before DFEL, the two kind
instances mixed together in the left corner and it is difficult for machine learning algorithms
to distinguish the differences. Clearly, the DFEL process could well separate the cyberattack from normal traffic.

In summary, the proposed framework not only reduce the data dimension but also dis22

cover the critical nonlinear relationships from the big dataset. The pretrained model from
DEFL could use the  value to optimize the detection time and accuracy of traditional machine learning algorithms. The data visualization with the DEFL features indicates the
high-level features are well grouped the cyberattack and normal traffic into two clusters.
There are two meaningful observations from the proposed deep feature embedding learning model.
• Adaptability: The DFEL can boost all the classifiers prediction speed and available
for real-time detection. Because the dimension of the dataset is reduced to a low
level, and the less calculation can decrease the algorithm running time. On average it
reduces 65.53% time to beat malicious packets. The IDS can balance the algorithm
running time and accuracy with the different priority.
• Robustness: The DFEL can help traditional machine learning algorithms to reach the
higher accuracy and recall level on various dataset. Because the high level features
separated intrusion and normal traffic into different clusters are easier for classifiers
to converge the optimal solutions.
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CHAPTER 4
TIME SERIES SECURITY ANALYTICS

This chapter presented the abnormal activity identification methodology which employed
the convolutional neural network embedding feature in 4.1. The method utilized in the well
known public dataset and the experiment result demonstrated in 3.2.3

4.1

Proposed Methodology for Efficiency Abnormal Activity Detection

In the context of edge computing, the computation process performed on distributed IoT
device nodes. The massive data generated by different types of IoT devices could be processed at the edge network instead of transmitting them to the centralized cloud infrastructure owing to bandwidth and energy consumption concerns [75]. On the other hand,
most of the IoT devices don’t contain high computational ability and memory space. The
heavy computation driven algorithms, like deep learning, are hard to deploy on the edge
node. The motivation of this study aims to develop a high-efficiency light architecture for
IoT devices to detect abnormal cases in the edge computing environment. To improve the
accuracy of abnormal cases detection, first, the oversampling algorithm applied on the abnormal (minority) observations in the datasets. The research [76] indicated that Synthetic
Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) could help predictive model performance in
various datasets. The second step transfers the sensor data to embedding high-level features through a pretrained convolutional neural network. Features from the higher-level are
more representative and abstract than original variables. By using the convolutional features, the conventional machine learning algorithms could converge faster and perform better accuracy [77]. The 4.1.1 explained the SMOTE oversampling methodology. The 4.1.2
demonstrated how to extract high-level features by using the convolutional neural network
on a big dataset. In the 4.1.3, the pretrained convolutional neural network from 4.1.2 used
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for generating embedding features for upcoming senor data. The embedding features have
smaller dimensions and highly representative for data distribution which suitable for edge
computing. This approach motivated by the previous researchers as well as the current
successful implementations of transfer learning in visual recognition and word embedding
text interpretation.

4.1.1

SMOTE

Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) generates synthetic examples rather
than oversampling with replacement. SMOTE creates synthetic examples in a less specific method by operating in feature space. The synthetic examples created the minority
class samples along the k minority class nearest neighbors which are randomly determined
based on the quantity of oversampling required. To generate minority samples Xn ew using SMOTE, first take the difference between the feature vector Xf , and it’s the nearest
neighbor Xn . The second step multiplies the difference with a random number η ∈ [0, 1].
Then, add it to the feature vector under consideration. The new samples Xnew generated
by SMOTE using previous minority Xminority is denoted as:

Xnew = Xminority + (Xf − Xn ) ∗ η

(4.1)

This strategy induces the selection of a random point between two specific features and
drives the decision section of the minority class to shift more general [76]. The final dataset
Xall is includes all instances of Xnew and Xmajority .
4.1.2

Convolutional Feature Extraction

The convolutional neural networks (CNN) well applied in analysis two-dimensional image
dataset. Convolutional Neural Networks are intended to identify visual patterns directly
from pixel images with minimal prepossessing [78]. In recent research, the convolutional
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neural networks also outperform in the time series structured data [79] [80] which one
dimension is time frame another is the fixed number of variables. The activity detection
sensors also generate time series structured data, and the convolutional neural network
can utilize to detect human activities. In the edge computing context, the time series data
computation is heavy duty for most IoT devices. So need consider to train a significant
amount of time series sensor data and utilize the pretrained model transfer new upcoming
data to high-level embedding features which could benefit light convention models. The
convolutional framework was designed to combine the differentiable transformations in the
corresponding layer. The manner to builds the layers called the network architecture. When
fitting the network to a dataset, it is essential to define a loss function that can be optimized.
In our framework, the cross-entropy loss function applied to detect multiple class activities.

J =−

1 X
yi log(ŷi )
N i=1

(4.2)

In the cross-entropy loss function 4.2, N is the number of activity categories, ŷi represents the predicted human activity and yi is the ground truth. Note that while the predicted
ŷi moves closer to yi , the output of loss function decreased. yi is the corresponding label of
xi ∈ Xall . When the data trained through the model, the loss function J calculated, and the
parameters W and b in the network are optimizing through gradient descent. By utilizing
the chain rule of differentiation, the gradients can obtain by backpropagation. For each
layer, the backpropagation computes the gradients through the derivation from the previous layer’s error. The principal advantage for this architecture layers can be implemented
independent, simplifying the process to form a network.
In this study, the convolutional neural network composed convolutional layers and fully
connected layer. The following parts explain the different types of layers that applied in
our neural networks.
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Convolutional Layer
Comparing with feed forward artificial neural networks, the convolution leverage three primary factors to improving machine learning systems: sparse interaction, parameter sharing,
and equivalent representation [81]. The convolution layer extracts the features form input
data through multiple kernels. The output of the convolution layer referred to as the feature map. The convolution operation denoted with an asterisk, for each layer the kernel
computation process defined as following [81].

C(i, j) = (I ∗ K)(i, j)

XX
m

I(m, n)K(i − m, j − n)

(4.3)

n

The I is two-dimensional input data, and the K is a two-dimensional kernel. Each
kernel slides across the input data to generate convolved features and extract different information from the input. The number of kernels determines the amount of output feature
maps for the next layer. The convolution utilizes the property of local spatial correlation
in the data array by making local connectivity patterns between neurons of adjacent layers [81]. Compare with the feedforward neural network, convolution layers significantly
reduce the number of parameters (computation complexity) and diminish the overfitting
problem. Generally, the architecture can use same kernel sizes, and the number of kernels
increment as layers build deeper. After the convolution step, the Rectified Linear Units
(Relu) activation function deployed to transform the feature map. The Relu function defined as follows.
f (x) = max(0, x)

(4.4)

Relu is one of the most notable non-saturated activation functions; the potential disadvantage is the zero gradients whenever the unit is not active. To handle that, the leaky Relu or
Parametric Relu shoulde be applied. Let xk be the k th feature map calculated through m by
m kernel at a given convolutional layer. The feature function can be presented as following:
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xkij = Relu 

m−1
X m−1
X

!
k−1
wab y(i+a)(i+b)
)

a=0 b=0


+ bk 

(4.5)

ij

In the function, the a, b denotes the size of the data array and bk is the bias. The information in the deeper layers are more abstract and need more kernels to learn the feature.
Regarding training time with gradient descent, the saturating non-linearity like sigmoid and
tanh are much slower than the non-saturating non-linearity like Relu [82].

Fully Connected Layer
Unlike the traditional convolutional neural networks for visual recognition, our framework
didn’t apply the pooling layer based on the worse empirical results on the human activity
dataset. After the several convolution layers, two fully connected layers built to predict
the human activities. Neurons had connections to all Relu activation in the previous layer,
like the feedforward artificial neural networks, and still compute dot products with Relu
activation. The final output layer contains multiple outputs, and a softmax activation function is applied to ensure that all predictions’ output probabilities sum to 1, due to the linear
constraint.
ex

P (y = j|x) = PK

Tw
j

xT wk
k=1 e

(4.6)

The softmax function defined as 4.6 which the output is the predicted probability for
the j th class under given a feature vector x and a weighting vector w. After training
the convolutional neural network on a large dataset, remove the output layer, deploy the
rest framework as a pretrained model for feature embedding. The dimension of the last
fully connected layer is the output dimension of the pretrained model. Consider the edge
computing context; the number of neuron in this layer should less than the amount of input
sensor variables.
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4.1.3

Embedding Feature for Recognition

Algorithm 3 CNNEF Algorithm for Convention Classifer
First Stage Train CNN on Large Historical IoT Data
Require: X, n, η,H(y, ŷ)
Ensure: D(x) = XW + b {X is two dimensional data}
F orward P ropagation
Build CN N with l layers and n ∗ l kernels
A(x) = max(0, x) {each layer0 s activition f uction}
Drop out {0.1 drop out af ter each layer}
F ully connected layer
Sof tmax(x) =

Tw
j
Tw
x
k
k=1 e

ex
PK

{Output layer}

Backpropagation
while validation acc not improve in last 5 epoch do
W (t + 1) = W (t) − η∂H(t)/∂W (t)
end while
Second Stage
U tilize CNN T rained M odel and Remove Output Layer
Require: x, CN N (trained){x is new IoT data}
Embedding F eature =CNN(x)
Recogniton = Classif er(Embedding F eature)
Reduce data dimension through a pretrained deep neural network could benefit the conventional machine learning algorithm on test dataset if the deep neural network performs
well on the training dataset. Also, this method outperforms the typical data feature reduction tool like PCA [72]. The feature embedding for the IoT streaming sensor data helps
classifiers to discriminate abnormal behavior and regular activities. The embedding features represent the latent and abstract information from original data. The pretrained convolutional neural network pushes the same target data points closer. The machine learning
algorithm could find a faster and better local optimal solution by using the high-level embedding features. This idea also motivated by the current homogeneous and heterogeneous
transfer learning application [83].
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4.2

Data Description and Experiment Evaluation

In this section, the authors present the overview of human activity data generating by the
IoT device in the edge computing environment. Then comparing the convention machine
learning algorithms’ recognition performance between original dataset and embedding features.

4.2.1

Data Collection

• UniMiB: This is a dataset of acceleration samples acquired with an Android smartphone designed for human activity recognition and fall detection [84]. The dataset
contains 11,771 samples of human activities which 9 types of activities of daily living
(ADL) and 8 types of falls. All the activities performed by 30 subjects of age ranging
from 18 to 60. The data obtained by using a window of 151 representations which
the signal are above 15 gravitational acceleration. The accelerometer signal is for
each time step made of a triplet of numbers (x, y, z) that represents the accelerations
along each of the 3 Cartesian axes. Each data observation contain 453 variables.
For the feature embedding purpose, the variables reorganized to 3*151 array to fit
convolutional neural networks. The experiment was designed to recognize abnormal
activities; all the target classes transfer to two levels: ADL and Abnormal(fall).

• HAPT: It’s a smartphone-based recognition of human activities and postural transitions dataset [85]. The data gathered through 30 volunteers within an age bracket
of 19-48 years. The signals were generated by accelerometer and gyroscope and the
noise filtered through a pre-processed method. The data were sampled with a sliding window of 2.56 seconds and 50% overlap. From each window, a vector of 561
variables acquired by calculating features from the time and frequency domain. The
dataset contains 10929 number of instances, six normal activities, and six postural
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transitions activities. For the feature embedding purpose, we transfer the variables to
3*187 array to fit convolutional neural networks. The experiment design to recognize
abnormal activities, the normal activities target classes transfer to ADL and postural
transitions activities consider as Abnormal.

4.2.2

Evaluation Metrics

This section described the evaluation metrics for the machine learning models. The evaluation metrics are essential to nominate the best strategy for abnormal human activity detection on wearable IoT devices. In the prediction results, true positive (TP) point to the
correct abnormal activity recognition, and false positive (FP) means to regard the ADL as
the abnormal activity. True negative (TN) refer to ADL correctly labeled and false negative
(FN) correspond to fail to identify abnormal activity. The experimental results are using
the following performance metrics.
• AUC: This metric evaluated how well a parameter can distinguish the ADL and abnormal activities. It is the area under the ROC curve which created by plotting the
true positive rate and the false positive rate at various cutoffs.
• Recall: This measurement reflects the classifier’s ability to detect abnormal activities
which are essential in our context. It is calculated by TP divided by the sum of NP
and TP.
• Precision: This metric related to the classifier’s ability to recognize the ADL without
the condition which calculated as TN divided by the sum of FP and TN.
• Processing Time Change: The recognize time is classifiers’ program running time.
The time change (TC) defined as the fraction of difference between classifier detection time with and without embedding feature (divided by the process time without
embedding feature.
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Convolutional Layer

Convolutional Layer

Convolutional Layer

Fully Connected Layer

…...

Figure 4.1: Convolutional Neural Network Architecture

4.2.3

Experiment Result Analysis

In the following, we will discuss the experiment results of two datasets. All the classifiers
have implemented through python sklearn and keras package. As mentioned before, the
convolutional neural network needs to train on a large dataset; then the pre-trained embedding feature could benefit the convention machine learning algorithm for upcoming new
data. So we split 70% main data for training the convolutional neural network and 30%
evaluation data for traditional 10-fold cross-validation. The main data normalized with the
standard deviation(Z-scores) first, then applied to evaluation data. Before we utilize the
proposed architecture, the main data need to transfer to the array discussed in 4.2.1. The
convolutional neural network builds as the Figure 4.1: the first convolution layer contains
64 kernels with size 2 by 2, the second layer contains 128 kernels with size 2 by 2, and the
fully connected layer includes 128 neurons to learn the latent feature. The UniMiB main
dataset’s two classes are balanced. However, the UHAPT main data need to apply SMOTE
oversampling double size the abnormal activities class which the proportion is less than
6%. After the main dataset trained through the convolution neural network, the output
layer removed and save the weights in the model to embedding the high-level feature for
evaluation dataset. The high-level features’ dimension is 128 which as same as the number
of fully connected layer. Indeed, the pretrained network filters the data noise and extract
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the refined the latent information. Six well-known convention machine learning algorithm
applied on the evaluation datasets: Logistic Regression (LR), K Nearest Neighbor (KNN),
Decision Tree (DT), Naı̈ve Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM). In the table 4.1 and 4.2, the models’ performances compared between original
evaluation dataset and embedding feature (EF) evaluation dataset.
UniMiB Evaluation Dataset 10-fold Crossvalidation
Model
AUC Std Recall Std Precision Std
LR
71.76 1.62 51.29 3.54
61.74
5.42
LR EF
99.33 0.30 99.05 0.54
99.05
0.79
KNN
96.29 1.39 90.51 2.33
98.87
0.86
KNN EF 99.43 0.37 98.85 0.88
99.55
0.48
DT
90.81 1.17 88.07 1.99
87.41
2.87
DT EF
98.94 0.56 98.38 1.20
98.26
1.07
NB
92.12 1.83 92.45 1.42
86.08
3.45
NB EF
99.09 0.54 99.07 0.79
98.40
1.07
RF
96.55 0.36 92.81 1.35
97.15
2.07
RF EF
99.25 0.35 99.01 0.80
99.27
0.43
SVM
71.09 0.40 18.21 4.16
100.00
0.00
SVM EF 99.53 0.37 99.09 0.85
99.64
0.47

Table 4.1: Models Performance Comparison on UniMiB Dataset
In the UniMiB evaluation dataset, the embedding feature boosts the performance of
convention machine learning models from different aspects. The pretrained convolution
neural network not only increases the average AUC, recall, precision level but also decreases the standard deviation of corresponding metrics. The recall metric is more important than the other two because the low recall value indicates the classifier predicts abnormal activities as the ADL. The classes’ performances are more robust with the embedding
feature. The machine learning algorithms include gradient-boosted trees, k nearest neighbor, decision tree, logistic regression, gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes, random forest and support
vector machine. The k nearest neighbor algorithm set five closest neighbor for query. The
decision tree algorithm set the minimum split split node is two with the criterion of Gini
index. There are one hundred trees in the random forest model, the minimum split is two
nodes without maximum depth of subtree. The logistic regression apply the l2 regular-
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ization to improve the performance. In the Naı̈ve Bayes, the continuous values associated
the each feature are assumed to be distributed following the Gaussian distribution.F99 The
support vector machine utilized polynomial function for classification. Logistic regression
and support vector machine failed to recognize the abnormal activities (falls) which got
low AUC and recall values. However, the embedding features significantly improve the
detection abilities of these two algorithms. The fundamental reason shows on Figure 4.2
that the pretrained convolutional neural network transfers the non-linear problem to linear
separable. All the convention classifiers’ classification abilities perform the same level on
the embedding feature. Although the support vector machine got worst AUC and recall on
original evaluation data, the embedding feature enhanced the three metrics to the best.

Model
LR
LR EF
KNN
KNN EF
DT
DT EF
NB
NB EF
RF
RF EF
SVM
SVM EF

AUC
99.87
99.84
98.63
99.49
94.41
98.14
98.84
99.27
99.37
99.25
99.82
99.02

HAPT Evaluation Data Set
Std Recall
Std
Precision
0.35 94.21 4.78
98.30
0.43 97.44 2.59
97.46
1.77 94.53 3.85
99.23
0.97 98.56 2.18
97.46
5.02 89.96 10.73
93.99
1.87 96.51 3.75
94.71
0.79 99.02 1.95
74.43
0.93 99.02 1.95
89.72
1.05 87.70 12.03
96.88
1.10 97.46 3.33
98.88
0.47 90.29 7.40
99.23
1.88 94.01 7.27
97.80

Std
2.70
6.53
2.30
5.12
7.77
7.95
16.33
11.20
6.53
3.33
2.30
4.63

Table 4.2: Models Performance Comparison on HAPT Dataset
The framework also significantly improve the classifiers’ prediction on HAPT evaluation data. Note that, the target levels are highly unbalanced, the abnormal activities observations are less than 6%. In this case, the AUC and Precision are not proper measurements
because more than 94% data belong to ADL class. All the convention algorithms, except
Naı̈ve Bayes keep the same, enhance the recall level and reduce the standard deviation of
10 fold cross-validation. On the other hand, Naı̈ve Bayes increase the precision and auc
level.
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Figure 4.2: PCA Visualization Comparison

Figure 4.3: HAPT PCA Visualization Comparison
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Figure 4.4: Algorithm Process Time Reduction
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 present data visualization comparison through principal component
analysis (PCA) dimension reduction. The dark dots are activities of daily life (ADL), and
the light dots are abnormal activities (fall). The x-axis indicates the first principal component that has maximum variance among all linear combinations. The y-axis measures
the remaining variation orthogonal to the first principal component. The two classed of
original UniMibB data mixed together and didn’t proper for linear separability algorithm.
After the embedding feature through the pre-trained convolutional neural network, the data
become much easier for convention machine learning algorithms to find an optimal solution. The low dimensions of feature and the pre-learned property also significantly reduce
the algorithms’ processing time. Figure 4.4 presented the processing time change evaluation metric. The support vector machine usually takes a relatively long time to process the
data because the property of the algorithm considered a quadratic programming problem
which is complexity approximately O(n2samples ∗ nf eatures ). The embedding features also
decrease the high computation cost dramatically. The less processing time means lower
energy consumption for IoT devices and release the burden of edge computation.
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In summary, the proposed model combined the advantage of deep learning and conventional machine learning algorithm. The empirical results presented the robustness of
high accuracy and notable time-saving in 10 cross-validations. The properties of computation complexity and energy consumption are reduced suitable to the application in the
edge computing. This approach could also be applied in other times-series based edge
computing real-time data analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN MACHINE LEARNING

In this chapter, we explain the standard technical terms used in the adversarial attacks
literature. Inspired by [58], We categorize the attack methods into the gradient-based attack, score-based attack, transfer-based attack and decision-based attack as figure 6.1. Intuitively, the three types of attack algorithms utilized different access level to the target
model. The remaining article followed the same definitions of the terms and notations in
Table 5.1.

5.1

Adversarial Attacks Strategies

Consider the deep neural networks (DNNs) f (x) = W T x. If the input data perturbed by
δx, the output increased by δx kW k1 . In DNNs, W is high dimensional; the linear function
is vulnerable to small δx. The objective of adversarial attack provides perturbed data x0 to
mislead the model generate output incorrectly, and the perturbation should be as small as
possible. In this section, the four types of algorithms in table 5.2 presented to give more
insight of adversarial attack.

5.1.1

Gradient-Based Method

Fast Gradient Sign Method
The advantage of this algorithm is aimed to generate adversarial images fast and efficient.
Note that, the adversarial images are not guaranteed to be misclassified, but they have high
confidence to fool the DNNs. The Goodfellow et al. [52] claimed the untargeted FGSM
attack which calculate the gradient of cost function w.r.t. the input of the neural network
by using the following equation:
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Figure 5.1: Adversarial Attacks Categories

x0 = x +  ∗ sign(∇x J(x, ytrue ))

(5.1)

The J is the cross-entropy cost function of a trained neural network. The given sample
X has corresponding target ytrue . ∇x denote the gradient, and the  is the hyper-parameter
to control the perturbation size. Usually the  is a small value, note that the experiments on
ImageNet(large-scale image recognition dataset), the top-1 error rate is around 63 - 69%
on the FGSM adversarial examples when  ∈ [2, 32] [86]. For the targeted attack, craft the
image to maximize the predicted probability to specific target class ytarget . The adversarial
equation, defined as follows:

x0 = x −  ∗ sign(∇x J(x, ytarget ))

(5.2)

This is the one-shot process to make the adversarial image classify as ytarget . The equa-
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Terms and Notations
Adversarial Example/ x0
Perturbation/δx

Perturbation
Measurement/ kδkp

Perturbation Scope

Targeted Attack
Untargeted Attack

Learning Style

White-Box Attack
Black-Box Attack
Gradient-Based Attack
Score-Based Attack
Transfer-Based Attack
Decision-Based Attack

Definition
The careful perturbed image data which
could fool the well-trained machine
learning, and they are hard to perceptible
the difference from the original image.
The noise added to the original image.
The standard metric is lp norm distance.
l∞ measure the maximal perturbation
in all dimensions. l2 is the Euclidean norm,
which indicates the ordinary distance. l1
means the sum of absolute value
difference. l0 reflect the number of
modified dimensions.
The perturbations can apply to all images
trained by a given model called universal
perturbation. The perturbation can only
affect the specific image called individual
perturbation.
Mislead the target model classify
the adversarial example to a specific label.
Mislead the target model classify the
adversarial example to an unspecific label.
One-shot learning just takes one step
to generate the adversarial example.
The iterative learning requires multiple steps
until the attack algorithm satisfies a
certain condition.
The adversarial attack algorithm has
full knowledge to target models’ parameters.
Generate the adversarial examples
without knowledge of target models.
The attack algorithm relies on the
gradient of the loss function, and detail
information of the target model.
The adversarial example generate
based on the prediction score.
Train the adversarial example on substitute
model and fool the target model.
Direct attacks target model that
only rely on the final prediction.

Table 5.1: Definition of Terms and Notations
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Decision-Based Attack

Transfer-Based Attack

Score-Based Attack

Gradient-Based Attack

Aattack Model Type

Adversary Knowledge
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
White-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box
Black-Box

Adversarial Goals
Targeted/Untargeted
Targeted/Untargeted
Untargeted
Untargeted
Targeted/Untargeted
Targeted
Untargeted
Targeted
Targeted/Untargeted
Untargeted
Targeted/Untargeted
Targeted
Targeted/Non-Targeted
Targeted/Non-Targeted
Targeted
Targeted/Non-Targeted
Targeted/Untargeted

Table 5.2: Summary of Attack Models

Model
FGSM
Momentum Iterative FGSM
DeepFool
SparseFool
Carlini and Wagner attack
Trust Region Attack
Universal adversarial perturbations
Decoupling Direction Attacks
One Pixel Attack
Local search Attack
Adversarial Transformation Networks
Generative Adversarial Attack
Curls and Whey Attack
Boundary Attack
Rotation Attacks
Hop Skip Jump Attack
Query-Limited Attack

Perturbation Scope
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Universal
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Universal
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual

Perturbation Measurement
l∞
l1
l2
l1
l∞ , l2 , l0
l∞ , l2
l∞ , l2
l2
l0
l2
l2
l∞ , l2
l2
l2
l∞
l∞ , l2
l∞

Learning
One-Shot
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative
Iterative

tion 5.2 maximize the logp(ytarget |X) through one-step move to direction of sign(∇x J(X, ytarget )).
The Goodfellow et al early attempts to explain the phenomenon as non-linearity and overfitting, but argued instead the primary reason is the linear nature of DNNS cause the vulnerability to adversarial examples. The [86] further propose the Basic Iterative Method(BIM),
which is a natural extension of FGSM. The BIM takes multiple iterations of small perturbations while modifying the gradient direction after each round.

Momentum Interactive Gradient Sign Method
The Dong et al. proposed the momentum interactive gradient sign method (MI - FSGM)
as an variation of BIM [55]. This method won the first places in 2017 Non-targeted and
Targeted Adversarial Attack Competitions. The momentum term was implemented in the
method to skip the local maxima in each iteration and stabilize update the direction during
the iterations. The generated adversarial examples have strong transferability which the
robust defensive model also vulnerable to the black-box attack. For the un-target MI FSGM attack, the first step needs to calculate the gradient with momentum term:

x00 = x, gt+1 = µ ∗ gt +

∇x J(x0N , ytrue )
k∇x J(x0N , ytrue )k1

(5.3)

Then add the perturbations based on sign of the gradient as:


x0N +1 = ClipX, x0N + α ∗ sign(gt+1 )

(5.4)

The µ is the decay factor and in each iteration, the ∇x J(XNadv , ytrue ) is normalized by
l1 distance, but other distance measures are also acceptable.
They claim that the adversarial examples can quickly drop into poor local maxima and
less likely perform well in other classifiers. With the integration of momentum into each
iteration, the active adversary also the alleviates the trade-off between the attack ability in
the current model and transferability to other models. In addition, the momentum strategy
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can be generalize to other gradient-based attacks.

DeepFool Attack
Moosavi-Dezfooli [53] proposed the attack algorithm for large-scale datasets by computing the minimum kδkp sufficient to misclassify the image. DeepFool designed to find the
closest distance from the original image to the decision boundary. At each iteration, the
classifier is linearized around the data point x; the minimum perturbation is the projection
of x to the decision boundary hyperplane. In other words, perturb a small vector to the
image and accumulated push the x out of current decision region. The author also indicated that DeepFool provides fewer perturbations size compare to the FGSM while having
a similar adversarial ability.

SparseFool Attack
This approach is a geometry inspired sparse attack which extends the work of Deepfool
[87]. The SpareseFool proposed to find the minimum l1 distance from the original image to
adversarial example. To guarantee the x0 lie onto the approximated hyperplane, project x
only towards one single coordinate of the vector at a time in each iteration. If the perturbed
image arrives the extreme value, the direction should be disregarded since it cannot provide a better solution. The authors also indicated it’s hard to converge in one-step because
the decision boundaries are only locally flat [88]. The generated x0 also bring semantic
information. For instance, the perturbations on some animal images are concentrated on
essential features, such as head, eyes, ears. This method enhances the perceptibility of
perturbations while maintaining sparsity and complexity. Compare with another sparse
perturbation algorithm one-pixel attack; the sparsefool find a better solution on large images with fewer computation powers.
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Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. demonstrated the existence of a universal and very small perturbation vector [89]. The algorithm aggregates the atomic perturbation vectors v that mislead
the x to the decision boundary. The problem formulated as the following two constraints:

kvkp ≤ 
(5.5)
0

P (f (x ) 6= f (x)) ≥ 1 − δ
The  determines the perturbation size, and δ controls the success rate of adversarial
examples. The DeepFool method is utilized to calculate the minimum perturbations until
most images are adversarial. At each iteration, the universal perturbation aggregated by
each samples’ minimal perturbation. This method also performs well cross various stateof-the-art convolutional neural networks. The visualization of universal perturbations is
different for various DNNs, although they exhibit a similar pattern. The authors further
demonstrated the correlation between different regions of the decision boundary and the
existence of universal perturbations.

Carlini & Wagner Attack
The Carlini & Wagner Attack (C&W) provide high-robustness adversarial examples that
break the defensive distilled and undistilled neural network 100% probability. Besides, the
adversarial examples generate from undistilled DNN transfer well to the distilled DNN.
The research in [54] define the problem as the following:
minimize kx − x0 kp
subject to C(x + δ) = y 0
 n
x + δ ∈ 0, 1
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The x is a fixed input image. The objective of the function is to find the perturbations δ
that minimizes the distance from original distance to adversarial distance and classify the
adversarial image as y 0 at the same time. The C&W utilized three distance metrics, L0 , L2 ,
L∞ , to measure the distance kx − x0 kp . The above formulation is difficult to solve because
the non-linear constraint C(X + δ) = y 0 . To solve this problem, the authors define an
alternative objective function as follow:
minimize c · kx − x0 kp + lossF,l (x0 )
 n
subject to x + δ ∈ 0, 1
The c is a constant number greater than 0 which use a modified binary search to choose
c. The C&W is essentially a refined iterative gradient attack with the multiple start points,
utilized box-constraint and Adam optimizer adversarial function. The authors explore the
different types of objective functions, and the original paper referred for more details.
DeepFool and Carlini & Wagner Attack are considered as a state-of-the-art attack algorithm; many later kinds of research compare the attack performance with them.

Trust Region Attack
This attack algorithm computes the perturbations efficiently and adaptive update the perturbation magnitude in every iteration while doesn’t require extensive hyper-parameter tuning
[90]. The trust region method is well known to optimize the non-convex problem and
extensively applied in the reinforcement learning networks. During each iteration, the attack algorithm chooses the trust radius to find the adversarial perturbation with the region
which the maximum mislead the classification. As the experiment results, this method requires significantly smaller perturbations comparing to DeepFool and computing remarkably faster than C&W while remaining similar perturbation magnitude.
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Decoupling Direction Attacks
This approach can generate the low l2 through decoupling the direction and the norm of
adversarial perturbations [91]. The optimization process doesn’t impose the penalty on
l2 . The norm constrained by projecting the δx on a -sphere around the x. During each
iteration, the l2 norm decreased if the perturbed image is adversarial; otherwise, increase
the l2 . In both cases project it back to a -sphere centered at x. This novel adversarial
training mitigates the perturbation size and generates the examples close to the decision
boundary iteratively.

5.1.2

Score-Based Method

The Score-Based Attack attacks are more skeptical and only depend on the predict class
probabilities [58]. Intuitively, the attacks estimate the gradient based on the prediction
score and often consider as black-box or semi-black-box attack.

One Pixel Attack
One pixel attack is a low dimension attack which only perturbs one or few pixels to generate
the adversarial image. The core function of this method is differential evaluation (DE).
There are two advantages of DE: (1) Higher probability of finding global optima. (2) Don’t
require the detail information of DNN [92]. The RGB channels perturbations transfer into
an array as candidate solution, then optimize the solution through DE formula as following:

xi (g + 1) = xr1 (g) + F (xr2 (g) + xr3 (g))
(5.6)
r1 6= r2 6= r3
The r1,r2,r3 are random indices into the population of n perturbations and the F is
mutation parameter. The algorithm chooses three random individuals from the previous
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iteration and combines them to a new solution. Then replace the old solution if the new
perturbations mislead the classifier with higher probability. Due to the natural property of
DE, the one-pixel attack is an efficient adversarial attack which can against many types
of neural network. Compare with the gradient-based attack, the one-pixel attack performs
lower success rate on ImageNet dataset but only need to modify one pixel of an image.
With the increasing number of modified pixels, this method also could improve the fool
rate.

Local Search Attack
Nina constructed the adversarial attacks algorithm in two steps [57]. First, add the random
add perturbation on a small set of critical pixels or one pixel to fool the network. Then
utilize the greedy local search to improve the effectiveness of perturbations. The experiments found that critical pixels are standard in the images. The DNNs are even vulnerable
to random perturbations. In each local search iteration, update the perturbation value of
the critical pixels and create more robustness x0 . Compare with the gradient-based attack,
this approach only mortifies a small fraction of pixels and adding fewer noises to original
images. From their experiments, the results are more effective than FGSM even don’t have
access to the DNNs’ parameters.

5.1.3

Transfer-Based Attack

The transfer-based attack needs information about the data but not rely on the model details.
Instead, this method generates the adversarial image from a substitute which utilized the
data trained the adversarial attacks [93]. The methods consistent with of Goodfellow’s
observation in [81] that the adversarial examples often transfer between the models For
example: Given the input x, first compute the adversarial perturbations δ based on the
substitute using C&W l0 ,l2 , l∞ attack and MI-FGSM. The apply a line search algorithm to
explore the smallest  for x + δ is still adversarial for the target model [60].
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Adversarial Transformation Networks
Baluja proposed Adversarial Transformation Network (ATN) that utilized a substitute a
network train the adversarial examples of attacking target DNNs [94]. The ATN not only
transfer the any x into x0 on target network while minimizing the perturbation size but
also capable of control the explicit type of misclassification There are two approaches to
generate the ATN: Perturbation ATN (P-ATN) and Adversarial Autoencoding (AAE). The
P-ATN generate sufficient perturbation effectively as a variation on the residual block. The
AEE reconstruct the original image with specific regularization. Baluja also extended the
work to apply ATN attack three DNNs at the same time. As the experiment result, 8392% ImageNet images fool the well-trained ImageNet DNNs through ATN’s single-pass
transformation.

Generative Adversarial Attack
Poursaeed et al. proposed a unifying framework to generate universal and image-dependent
perturbations for both classification and semantic segmentation adversary tasks.[95]. This
method leverage the benefits of generative models and further enhanced the robustness
of universal perturbations. The authors considered the U-Net and ResNet as perturbation
generator architecture. The H(·) represents the cross-entropy function, and the following
fool loss function gives good results in the targeted and untargeted attack:

luntargeted = −log(H(f (x), yture )
(5.7)
ltargeted = log(H(f (x), ytarget )
The perturbation generator also can attack multiple target models at the same time. The
experiment results showed that ResNet generator outperforms U-Net generator in many
cases. The universal perturbation trained by multiple target models has better transferability
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cross different other models.

Curls & Whey Attack
This novel black-box approach alleviates redundant perturbation and generates the iterative
trajectories efficiently [96]. During the Curl iterations, substitute model value the feedback
of the target model, first perturb x along the gradient descend. When the cross-entropy on
target model is lower than the previous step, carry out the gradient ascend. After generating
the x0 , they utilize the binary search to refine the perturbations. The whey optimization
further squeezes the perturbation by minimizing the noise in multiple steps. In each whey
iteration, the perturbation multiplies by the mask while ensuring the adversarial example.
The empirical result indicate that Curls & Whey attack mitigate the difficulty of blackbox target attacks remarkably. The generated x0 has stronger transferability with smaller l2
distance.

5.1.4

Decision-Based Method

The decision-based attacks only rely on the final decision of the model (top 1 label) [58],
which does not rely on the gradient information. In other words, these related approaches
are insensitive to the gradient masking or missing gradient. The boundary attack and spatial
attack are discussed in the following contents.

Boundary Attack
The boundary attack applies to real-world black-box models and more robust to distillation
defense [58]. This method starts from a significant (full) perturbation, then reduce the distance to original data and still stay in decision boundary. It performs the random walk along
the adversarial and non-adversarial regions. The logic steps of the algorithm described as
follow:
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1. Given two images, one is already adversarial and another one is original: x0 classified
as y 0 and x classified as y.
2. Draw random perturbations δ from the proposed distribution and update x0 to x0new .
3. If x0new is still adversarial, update the x0 = x0new , else the x0 keep the same.
4. Repeat the step 2 and 3 until the D(x, x0 satisfies the defined criterion.
The boundary attack conceptually simple, extremely flexible and requires little hyperparameters [58]. The generated adversarial examples are competitive with the best gradientbased attacks. However, this method needs much more computation time.
Rotation Attack
The spatial attack just applied the simple image spatial transformation: translations and
rotation [59]. Even the models trained with proper augmentation, they are still vulnerable
to natural transformation. The essential idea is straight forward: Discrete the transformation parameters in a particular range. Then exam every possible choice until find one
mislead the wrong prediction. The authors proposed three variation methods based on this
idea. Note that, the few random queries usually suffice the misclassification. This method
shows that the conventional neural networks are vulnerable to a natural and straightforward
transformation from a few random tries.
Query-Limited Attack
Consider the three restrictions of query limitation, partial-information, and the label only
problem in the real world, the Ilyas et al. proposed the black-box Partial Information Attack
attack which in the context of restrictions [97]. First, the natural evolutionary strategies
(NES) applied to estimate the gradient that maximizes the expected value of loss function within search distribution. Then, during the iterations, optimize the backtracking line
search to find perturbation and generate the x0 only in several steps of the projected gradient
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descent algorithm. The authors also demonstrated that the targeted black-box attack efficiently against the commercial classifier Google Cloud Vision API within limited query
access and partial information.

5.1.5

HopSkipJump Attack

The goal of HopSkipJump Attack trains model to generate adversarial examples based
on an original estimate of gradient direction using binary information at decision boundary [98]. Compare to boundary attack; this algorithm requires significantly fewer model
queries.
During each iteration, there are three components to formulate the x0 . First, push the
updated x to the decision boundary through binary search. Second, measure the Monte
Carlo gradient direction from three sources: bias at the boundary for nonzero perturbation
size, the bias of deviation from the boundary and estimated variance. Third, update the
step size along the gradient direction until x0 cross the boundary. This approach achieves
similar l2 , and l∞ distance compare with the white-box attack C & W and BIM. The authors
also indicate the HopSkipJump Attack generate more robustness x0 than C & W and BIM,
which superior transferability performance on target models. This hyperparameter-free
algorithm provides insights between the gradient estimation and binary search with limited
mode queries.

5.2

Adversarial Threat in the Real World

The adversarial attack not only related to the lab experiments, but the threat is also real to
the physical world. With the widely applied DNNs, the researchers should pay attention to
increase the robustness of models. However, as we discuss in the 5.3.3, the high accuracy
and robustness are conflicts goal in some cases. This section demonstrated the practical
adversarial attack in a real-world situation.
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5.2.1

Surveillance Cameras Attack

Thys et al. fist developed the printable adversarial patches to hide a person from the person
detector camera [30]. The adversarial patch objective function minimized the probability
related to the appearance of a person in the output of the YOLOv2 object detector. In their
experiments, minimizing the object loss perform the best robustness perturbation on adversarial patches. As a result, the detector fails to identify the person who holds the small
printed patch. It’s a critical issue for the automatic surveillance cameras which vulnerable to this kind of attacks. The intruders could sneak around the undetected by holding
small cardboard in the front of the body aimed toward the surveillance camera or wear an
adversarial ”T-shirt” [30].

5.2.2

Face Identification Attack

The wearable printed adversarial glass frame can fool the facial identify detector [99]. The
attacks are physically realizable and inconspicuous and allow the attacker to impersonate
another individual. Similarly, the printed adversarial attach a sticker on the hat can fool the
public Face ID model LResNet100E-IR and transferable to other Face ID system [100].
During the adversarial sticker training, the rectangular sticker image has imitated the form
on the hat, bent and rotated. The attack model reduced the TV loss of initial image and
cosine similarity of ArcFace image and obtained the image.

5.2.3

Road Sign Attack

The Eykholt et al. proposed the robust physical perturbations attack to mislead the road
sign classification under various dynamic physical conditions [31]. The Poster Attacks and
Sticker Attacks are considered to fool the LISA-CNN classifier. The experiments designed
in two-stages: Lab test with fixed positions and moving test at realistic driving speeds. The
work result shows that the adversarial examples are possible to fool the image classifiers in
widely varying distance and angles.
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5.3

Discussions and Challenges

Since Szegedy et al. surprisingly discovered the existence of adversarial examples; the
reason was unexplained. Initially, they have suspected that the complexity, non-linear deep
learning models could lead to very random classifications. However, the Goodfellow disagree with that due to two experimental observations [52]. First, the adversarial example
also misleads the simple traditional classifiers. Second, the different models mislabel the
adversarial example to the same class. So the complexity of the deep learning model is not
the primary reason, and the adversarial examples have cross-modal generalization property.

5.3.1

Robustness of Adversarial Examples

We reviewed four categories of attack algorithms in different aspects, and they have a
different level of access to the target model. We noticed that the white-box attacks not
always more reliable than black-box attacks. Most attacks are based on the individual
image level, not the universal perturbation. Recent approaches focus on mitigating the
perturbation size and improve computation efficiency. It’s essential to adversarial attacks
that the perturbations are unperceivable to human beings. For the streaming attack, the
algorithm computation may consider an essential factor. Otherwise, the robustness of the
adversarial example indicates the practical value. In real-world applications, it’s hard to
have access to the target model. So transferability should be the most significant evaluation
factor to the robustness of adversarial example. The transfer-based attack algorithms can
generalize the perturbations to multiple target models. The adversarial examples generated
through this kind of attack may have better transferability than other attacks.

5.3.2

Reason behind Adversarial Examples

The potential reason behind the adversarial attack The linearity hypothesis, proposed by
Goodfellow, indicates that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
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ples because the models behave input data extremely linearly [52]. Although the current
deep neural networks contain many non-linear active functions, they can be very linear as a
function to input data. One principle problem of DNNs is a lack of knowledge of how they
learn and what they learn from data[101]. The Model learning procedure aimed to generalize test samples equivalent to creating cliques among the enormous number of nodes which
emphasis on specific training samples. The learning process cannot correctly generalize the
training data, and the nodes don’t make highly collaborative with each other.

5.3.3

DNNs Robustness and Accuracy

Some researchers claimed that the goal of the robustness and accuracy of the deep learning
model is hard to be achieved at the same time. The more accurate DNNs model appears to
be less robust in terms of required adversarial attack strength[102]. The increasing sensitivity or deeper model improves accuracy while making the DNNs more vulnerable. The
phenomenon is a consequence of robust classifiers learning different feature representations
than standard classifiers against the adversarial perturbations[103]. However, the extensive
experiments also indicated another possibility [104]. If the adversarial examples constraint
to the manifold, the adversarial examples can be considered as generalization errors, and
the on-manifold adversarial training boosts the generalization and robustness at the same
time. In this chapter, we reviewed the adversarial attack threats in four categories: gradientbased attacks, score-based attacks, transfer-based attacks, and decision-based attacks. Despite the high performance of deep learning applications in computer vision, the models are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The adversarial examples are not only fooled the specific
well-known DNNs but also can transfer to other DNNs. The threat is real. Researchers
paid increasing attention in security-related domains. We provide detail adversarial attack
guidelines based on recent reviews and discuss the pros and cons of different types of attack
methods. Besides the previous discussion, future research should consider less perturbation
size and imperceivable to human acknowledgment. In the practical level, the transferability
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of perturbation is an essential factor to mislead the various state-of-the-art classifiers. For
deep learning security, it is a challenge to improve the robustness and accuracy of DNNs
at the same time. We believe the emerging demand would further motivate the development of this field and hope our reviews could help researchers build an overall picture of
adversarial attacks.

5.4

Proposed Adversarial Attacks Algorithms

Motivated by previous research of adversarial attacks, our new adversary attacks model
proposed for the dissertation defense: superpixel gradient attack and border gradient attack.
The goal is not only to improve the robustness of adversarial attacks but also to make one
step toward the robustness of the neural network.

5.4.1

Superpixel Methodology

Superpixel gradient attack is an extension of the momentum interactive gradient sign method
(MI - FGSM). This method aimed to improve the targeted attack adversarial examples’ confident level. The previous gradient-base attack doesn’t consider the semantic meaning of
the image; the perturbation size  is fixed for all pixels during each iteration. However, the
fixed  may not the best perturbation size for all pixels. The research [57] noted that distinct
pixels have different ”powers” to influence the output confidence. The assumption is that:
the pixels have similar characteristics that may require a different size of perturbation to
maximize the target attack class probability in each iteration. To cluster the pixels based on
their color similarity and proximity in the image plane, the simple linear iterative clustering
(SLIC) implement to generate the segmentation as a prepossess for the adversarial attack.
The SLIC algorithm is a particular case of k-means tasks to generate superpixel in which
a group of pixels has similar characteristics [105]. This segmentation method is widely
applied due to the low computation cost and high segmentation quality. After the SLIC
step, the data is ready to generate the adversarial image through the following algorithm.
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Algorithm 4 Superpixel Gradient Attack
Require: A classifier f with loss function J, an original example x and corresponding
label y, the attack target label y target the list of superpixel P , a list perturbation size ,
decay factor µ and number of iterations T .
Ensure: An adversarial example xadv with xadv − x ∞ ≤ Max()
α = /T , y 6= y target
g0 = 0; xadv = x; t = 0
while t less than T do
update gt+1 by accumulating the velocity vector in the gradient direction
∇ J(xadv
,y target )
t
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇ xJ(xadv
k x t ,ytarget )k1
adv
by applying
Update a list of Xt+1
 the sign of gradient and list of α
adv
adv
Xt+1 = xt − α · sign(gt+1 )
adv
, then randomly reconstruct the N adverThe atomize the superpixel P in the list Xt+1
sarial example candidates.
Calculate the y target confidence score in N adversarial candidate examples, then
choose the highest one update the xadv
t+1
end while
The momentum iterative effectively avoids the poor local maxima. A list of perturbation size is defined to construct the adversarial example candidates. In the each iteration,
first calculate n adversarial example candidates based on n different perturbation size .
Second, atomize each adversarial example candidates by K superpixel. Third, utilize the
n ∗ K superpixel to reconstruct the adversarial example candidates. There are K n distinct
combinations; each combination’s perturbation size is different. Consider the computation
complexity; the method can randomly reconstruct m examples. Then calculate the confidence score of attack target class for each candidate adversarial examples, choose the one
with the highest score to join the next iteration.
Note that, the momentum term benefit the superpixel attack skip the poor local maxima,
and the superpixel reconstruction makes the adversarial example more likely to transfer to
other models.
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Figure 5.2: Compare the MI-FGSM and Superpixel Attack

5.4.2

Superpixel Experiments

The proposed model applied to several images and get similar results. The superpixel
gradient attack outperforms the MI-FGSM which the first place of 2017 NIPS target attack
adversarial competition. The figure 5.2 is one of preliminary experiment. In the first column, from the top to bottom are the original image, MI-FGSM adversarial image, and perturbations. The middle column is the original image, superpixel attack adversarial image,
and corresponding perturbations. The right column shows the SLIC superpixel segmentation with 5, 12 and 21 number of superpixels in corresponding images.
In the experiment, we deploy a pretrained VGG19 to recognize the banana as top1
with 99.03% confidence and try to generate an adversarial example recognized as cucumber. Then perform the MI-FGSM and superpixel attack. When two approaches reach 120
iterations, the proposed method is 4.18% higher than MI-FGSM. Consider the computation complexity, the number of superpixels is 5 and the number of adversarial examples is
200. The MI-FGSM perturb 0.05 in each step and the superpixel attack has the discrete
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Figure 5.3: MI-FGSM and Superpixel Attack Confidence Score Comparison
list of perturbation value: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05. The interesting thing between several model test is that the superpixel attack performed as same as the MI-FGSM in the
early stage. However, when the adversarial example robustness hard to improve in the
later stage, the superpixel attack surprisingly moves the adversarial toward the target class
further. Even surpass the optimal solution point, the proposed method decreases the confidence much slower. In other words, in the later stage of learning, the well reconstructed
adversarial images are benefit from various  perturbation among superpixels. The figure5.3 give me more motivation to go deeper into this method. The experiment results also
implicit with our assumption mentioned before.

5.4.3

Border Gradient Attack Methodology

The border gradient attack is an intuitive method that a significant increase in the efficiency
of the gradient attack. The perturbation on the white border significantly boosts the performance of the targeted attack.
The attack methodology inspire by the linear hypothesis[81]. consider the deep neural
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network (DNN) f (X) = W T X. If the input data perturbed by δX, the output increased by
δX kW k1 . In DNN, W is high dimensional; the linear function is vulnerable to small δX.
The objective of the adversarial attack provides perturbed data X∗ to mislead the model
to generate output incorrectly. In the border attack, the prepossess step randomly decided
the region of the white border, then naturally resize the image to fit the border. The white
border doesn’t push the image to the edge of the decision boundary. Figure 5.4 demonstrate
that the image with broader also can be correctly identified and doesn’t lose the confidence
level. However, the perturbations on white space are more robust to infect the adversarial
example classification. The detail of the algorithm introduced by the following:
Algorithm 5 Border Gradient Attack
Require: A classifier f with loss function J, an original example x and corresponding
label y, the attack target label y target , the perturbation size , and number of iterations
T ,image size M ∗ N
Ensure: An adversarial example xadv with xadv − x ∞ ≤ 
Resize the image to (M-m)*(N-n)
Fill the border with value 0 in RGB channels
α = /T , y 6= y target
g0 = 0; xadv = x; t = 0
while t less than T do
update gt+1 by accumulating the velocity vector in the gradient direction as
∇ J(xadv
,y target )
t
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇ xJ(xadv
k x t ,ytarget )k1
adv
update the xt+1 by applying the sign of gradient
adv
− α · sign(gt+1 )
xadv
t+1 = xt
end while
The momentum term also applied here to boost the model performance. The decay
factor utilized during the iteration. When the µ = 0, the function is as same as the BIM
which mentioned in chapter??.
5.4.4

Border Gradient Attack Experiments

The preliminary experiment gets a promising result. The border attack test in several images gets a similar result: an incredible increase in the targeted attack adversarial confidence score. In the figure5.4, the method generated the adversarial example classify as
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Figure 5.4: Compare the MI-FGSM and Border Attack
a cucumber. The first column is the original image, adversarial example from MI-FGSM
attack and the perturbations. The second column is the resized image with a white border,
the adversarial example from border attack and corresponding perturbations. Note that, the
resized image recognize by pretrained VGG19 as well as the clean one. However, the border attack adversarial example has more than 35.94% confidence to mislead the prediction
as a cucumber.
Figure 5.5 presented the target probability in each stage; these two algorithms performed similarly in the early stage. However, the border attack is more powerful in the
later stages. The future work could focuses on the testing model on a large set of data and
supplements the theory and mathematical intuition.
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Figure 5.5: MI-FGSM and Border Attack Confidence Score Comparison

5.5

Discussion

In this chapter, we reviewed the adversarial attack threats in four categories: gradient-based
attacks, score-based attacks, transfer-based attacks, and decision-based attacks. Despite
the high performance of deep learning applications in computer vision, the models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The adversarial examples are not only fooled the specific
well-known DNNs but also can transfer to other DNNs. The threat is real. Researchers
paid increasing attention in security-related domains. We provide detail adversarial attack
guidelines based on recent reviews and discuss the pros and cons of different types of attack
methods. Besides the previous discussion, future research should consider less perturbation
size and imperceptible to human acknowledgment. In the practical level, the transferability
of perturbation is an essential factor to mislead the various state-of-the-art classifiers. For
deep learning security, it is a challenge to improve the robustness and accuracy of DNNs
at the same time. We proposed superpixel adversarial attack and border adversarial attack
algorithm which fool the model with high confidence. The experiments indicated that the
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perturbation size in pixel level are matters to prediction result. The optimization size could
be different in cross the model in each iterations. And a special border for adversarial example could boost the attack ability significantly. This finding is also consistent with the
adversarial patch research which generate perturbations on a specific space and location
in whole dataset. The one adversarial patch could fool the whole dataset efficiently. The
evaluation of adversarial attacks is another problem. Unlike the traditional machine learning classification, the ROC or accuracy could be a good metrics in many cases. However,
the based on the definition of adversarial example, there are four aspects to evaluate the
adversarial example: perturbation size, fool confidence level, computation cost and transferability. It’s hard to cross evaluate the adversarial example, we suggest to develop an
public adversarial platform to assess the robustness of adversarial examples. We believe
the emerging demand would further motivate the development of this field and hope our
reviews could help researchers build an overall picture of adversarial attacks.
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CHAPTER 6
ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES IN MACHINE LEARNING

Deep learning is widely considered as a “black box” system — we all know it performs excellently; however, with limited knowledge of the reason. Many studies previously tried to
explain the deep neural work [106], and interpret the adversarial examples may help us gain
more intuitive insights of neural networks and the problematical of the decision boundary
[107]. Deep learning has reached extensive achievement in a diversity of contexts, such
as image classification [108], language translation[109], and voice analysis [110]. As the
deep learning model developed for the high demanding and sensitive application, it grows
attention increasingly to consider the security of deep learning models against adversarial
attacks.
Adversarial examples include imperceptible perturbations designed explicitly by an adversary to mislead a well-performed deep learning model based on their gradient information. These examples pose a critical threat to severe security problem to widely daily life
applications like autonomous driving, surveillance system [111] and biometric verification
[112]. Furthermore, if a small size perturbation could drastically fool the deep learning
models’ output with a high-confidence, it indicates that the state-of-the-art models are not
distinctively learning the data as we design.
Adversarial training is one of the most extensively investigated defenses against adversarial attacks [65]. The goal is to improve the robustness of the model by train the adversarial examples from scratch. It’s not only against the perturbed image but also increase the
classification rate on small dataset [52]. However, adversary training is time-consuming
and need more time to converge the model.

63

6.1

Adversarial Defense: The Countermeasures for Adversarial Examples

The adversarial defense polices generally has two types of strategies: 1) Type A: Adversarial detecting or denoising without modifying the neural network. 2) Type B: improve
the robustness of neural network. The type A has two types: Adversarial Detecting and Input reconstruction. The type B contains two types: Network Improvement and adversarial
training. In addition,the ensemble methods are also discussed in this chapter.

6.1.1

Adversarial Detecting

There are many researches try to detect the adversarial examples before the test data processed by predictors.
[113] train the binary detector from various gradient-base attack adversarial examples. Detectors trained on the stronger iterative adversary approaches generalize well to
the weaker one-shot adversary but not vice versa.
The majority of adversarial examples detection methods are designed by the following essence idea: given a K class trained classifier and original training observations D =
0

0
d M
{xi ∈ Rd }N
i=1 . Construct a set of adversarial examples D = {xj ∈ R }j=1 . And develop

an procedure to distinguish the D0 from D. The Gong [114] proposed a binary classifier
to separate the adversarial apart from clean data with high accuracy. The author also discovered that the binary classifier is sensitive the adversarial attack algorithms. Specifically,
the binary classifier trained on FGSM examples is not robust to the JSMA examples, and
vise versa. However, if the classifier trained on mixed adversarial examples of FGSM and
JSMA, the classifier could detect both with good performance. The Grosse [115] add the
”Attack” class as an outliers class of model, train the model with clean and adversarial data
together. The author assume that only need a bounded number of examples to measure the
distribution difference of adversarial example and clean data using a consistent statistical
test. The experiment result is robust to strong adversaries based on transferability which
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the attacks algorithm is known to be hard to detect. When the perturbation is too small to
identified as outliers, the model often recover the original class and correctly classify the
adversarial examples. Contrast to the previous ones, the Metzen [113] built the detector by
using the middle layers features as input data to identify the D0 from D. A detector could
recognize adversarial examples by discovering inputs that are slightly off the clean data
manifold’s center in the certain direction of a nearby class boundary which generalizes to
unseen data needs certain regularities of perturbations. However, the Carlini [54] indicated
the detection methods are significantly less efficient in identifying an adaptive adversary
equipped with a strong attack. To address the challenge, the Xuwang Yin first proposed
an adversarial example detector method with an norm constrained which guarantee to recognize the potential threat. The author formulated an asymmetrical adversarial training to
learn class conditional distribution further gives rise to generative detection. In [116], pang
propose to use a threshold strategy as the detector to remove the adversarial examples for
robust classifier. The author design an reverse cross-entropy training procedure to defense
various attacks algorithms.
The detectors trained for the DeepFool-based methods do not generalize well to other
adversary examples; however, detectors trained for the iterative adversaries generalize relatively well to the DeepFool adversary examples. The [117] proposed the SafetyNet to
prevent the Type I and Type II attacks. The authors extracted the binary threshold of each
ReLu layer’s output as the features of the adversarial detector and identified adversarial examples by an RBF-SVM classifier. They also claimed that their methodology is difficult to
be defeated by adversaries even when adversaries know the detector since it is challenging
for adversaries to find an optimal solution for both adversarial examples and new features
of SafetyNet detector.
The [118] investigated prediction confidence on adversarial examples through looking
at Bayesian uncertainty estimates which available in dropout neural networks, and performing density estimation in the subspace of high level features learned by the model. They
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proposed a bayesian neural network to distinguish the adversarial examples and clean data.
[119] not only implement the detector but also utilized a reformer auto-encoder to moves
adversarial examples towards the manifold of normal examples, which is effective for correctly classifying adversarial examples with small perturbation. The authors also claim that
instead of discovering properties of adversarial examples from distinct generation manners,
a defense would be more generalized by obtaining intrinsic common properties among all
adversarial generation processes.
The [120] indicated that generative models could detect perturbations and observe that
most adversarial examples lie in low probability regions. The PixelDefend against the
adversarial attacks through a purification procedure and found that the distribution of adversarial examples is different from clean data. [116] proposed to minimize the reverse
cross-entropy which promotes a deep network to learn latent features that better distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones. Employ a threshold strategy as the detector
to separate the adversarial examples for mitigate the effects for robust prediction. The [116]
proposed to train a reverse cross-entropy to encourage the DNN to distinguish the adversarial examples from clean data through the latent representations. The reverse cross-entropy
performed the DNN to predict with high confidence in the target class and similar distribution on the others. The method is simple to implement with little extra computation cost
compared to the standard cross-entropy minimization.

6.1.2

Input Reconstruction

The adversarial example could convert to the no threat image through the input reconstruction procedure. The Gu and Rigazio [61] proposed the denoising auto-encoder as a
defense. The autoencoder is a neural network which trained the adversarial examples map
to the original. The model can predict the related clean example as output. The objective
is to apply the autoencoder as a prepossessing function before train the machine learning
model. The autoencoder trained without the knowledge of adversarial examples’ distribu-
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tion. And generalize perform well on the various networks. However, the authors also find
out that the denoising autoencoder could make the DNN more sensitive to new adversarial
example.
The [121] utilized the non-local means filter to mitigate the effects of perturbations
which widely applied in the reinforcement learning. Comparing with other bilateral filter,
mean filter and median filters, the non-local mean filter significantly increase the accuracy
and the robustness of target model. They also observe that adding non-local denoising
blocks to the shallower ResNet-50 can slightly enhance accuracy in the non-adversarial
environment, but the ResNet-152 will diminish gain. The [122] propose a sparse transformation layer which transfer the adversarial example to the clean examples’ manifold. The
transformation layer is between the input image and the first layer of the neural network to
efficiently project images into our quasi-natural image space. The pipline of the defense
framework first applied a denoising auto-encoder to cluster the images. Then choose the
dictionary corresponding to the chosen cluster and jointly optimize the sparse feature maps
and filters in this dictionary. This method achieve a strong defense on slightly perturbed
images (DeepFool & CW) and maintain high accuracy on clean data. However, still hard to
prevent the large perturbations (FGSM) attacks. They also found that the transformationsbased adversarial defenses aim to remove adversarial perturbations while preserving useful
details, however usually remove the filter out the them both together.
The PixelDefend transfer the adversarial images back to normal thourgh the PixelCNN
method which a generative model with tractable likelihood especially designed for images
[123]. The PixelCNN defines the joint distribution over all pixels by factorizing it into a
product of conditional distributions. The defend method constraint the pixel value with
certain distributions and control the new changes on the adversarial examples.
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Figure 6.1: Adversarial Attacks Categories [62]

6.1.3

Network Improvement

The Papernot et al. developed the defensive distillation [62]. This method utilizes the
knowledge of DNN to enhance the robustness and can be considered a technique of ”gradient
masking”. Many gradient-based attacks defense against by this approach which the model
implicitly to yield masked gradient. At a high level, a teacher model trained first, then
apply the teacher to train each data instance with the soft label. So the distillation model
developed from the teacher model on soft labels with higher probability recognizing the
hard label. The distillation function is a variation from softmax function which adds the
temperature T :
exi /T
sof tmax(x, T )i = P xj /T
je

(6.1)

Intuitively, increase the temperature T cause ’the softer label’, on the other hand, causes
the hard maximum. Here are the detail steps to train the defensive distillation:
1. Train a teach network with temperature T on softmax function.
2. The distillation network, with same network architecture as the teacher, will train on
soft labels. The distilled network also use temperature T .
3. Predict the test data with temperature T = 1.
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The linear hypothesis can explain the effectiveness of soft label [81]. The distillation
network was intended for learning the large weights and strong response. The soft label
penalizes the classifier to explore the extreme prediction regions. Enforce the model learn
the data with a smaller slope.
Some research improves the robustness of the network by checking whether the input
data satisfies the specific property. The Reluplex is the verification method for ReLu activation function in the DNN. [124] employed the Satisfiability Modulo theory solver to verify
the neural network which the small size perturbation does not affect the accuracy. However, it’s running very slow because it needs to check each node individually. Alternatively,
the DeepSafe provides the safe regions of a DNN using Reluplex, which the robustness a
safe region only regarding a target class. In performing so, the approach recognizes and
provides proof for regions of safety in the input space within which the network is robust
concerning target labels [125].

6.1.4

Adversarial Training

Training the adversarial examples is an intuitive defense measure to improve the robustness of DNN. The [126] observed that adversarial training could mitigate the effect of adversarial examples. The [52] showed that adversarial training could provide an additional
regularization benefit beyond that provided by using dropout alone. [86] first utilized the
adversarial training on the ImageNet dataset. The proposed method inserts a certain number of adversarial examples to each mini-batch during the training. Also, they discover the
”label Leaking” effect which the accuracy of the ”FGSM” adversarial image becomes much
higher than the accuracy of the clean image. But the effect vanishes if an iterative method
is used, presumably because the output of an iterative process is more diverse and less
predictable than the output of a one-step process. [86] indicated that adversarial training
could implement as an regularization tool to avoid overfitting. [107] propose the ensemble
adversarial training which augments training data with perturbations transferred from ex-
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ternal models. They also found that the trained models are more vulnerable to black-box
examples than to the white box examples.

6.2

Statistical Signature of Adversarial Example

In this chapter, we demonstrate a new property of adversarial examples. Specifically, we
explored that the adversarial examples rise a statistical signature in the intermediate layers
of neural networks which includes the distance to original point and co-variance of a feature
representation. We call this property as ”statistical signature” of adversarial examples.
The experiment result of our proposed framework shows that, we can successfully remove
the various adversarial example efficiently through the intermediate layers without extra
training. The signature could find in various neural networks and transfer learning models.
Furthermore, we will provide the intuition for the existence of these statistical signatures.
This outstanding property at representation levels could build several barriers for the neural
networks in development of adversarial attacks. To construct the unidentified adversarial
examples, the attack algorithm would require to fool the multiple intermediate layers in the
deep neural networks. We consider this work is an important step towards the robust neural
networks.

6.2.1

Statistical Hypothesis Testing
0

To distinguish original training observations xi from D and adversarial examples xj from
D0 using statistical signature, we assume the representation signature of D is followed by
a normal distribution and quite different than the representation signature of D0 in some
layers.
Formally, the null hypothesis H0 states that the D = D0 and the alternative hypothesis
HA is that the D =
6 D0 . The Statistical test distinguish the difference between D and D0
based on whether the p value reach to a significant value α. In statistics, the p-value is the
probability of obtaining results as extreme or as the observed results. Typically, a p-value
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of less than 0.05 is statistically significant, which indicates there is less than 5% probability
the null hypothesis is correct. If the p-value higher than 0.05 is not statistically significant,
the alternative hypothesis needs to reject and retain the null hypothesis. In this study,
the D and D0 are high dimensional data. In the multivariate two-sample test, Biau [127]
utilized their test statistic the L1 distance between discretized measures of the probabilities.
When the sample size increases, the partitioning is refined. However, the search space of
partitioning is impracticable for high dimensional problems, since there are too few points
per bin. Rosenbaum [128] proposed a method to estimate the minimum distance nonbipartite pairing over the aggregate data. The number of pairs contains a sample from two
distribution are treated as a test statistic.
To simply to detection process, we extract the statistical signature of data points. In our
experiments, we find when the the D and D0 are mapped to the learned representations of
neural network, the statistical signature of of D and D0 are separated to each other. The
intermediate layers of classifiers boost a signal to D0 , and adversarial examples become
more distinguishable from D. As a result. we can utilize the statistical tools, like z-score
outliers indemnification, on representation features to detect the adversarial examples. In
6.3 we empirically demonstrate how to remove the D0 effectively and prevent the potential
threat of adversarial examples. Our framework could also generalized to any other deep
neural networks without too much computation cost. For the representation features, we
consider to calculate the l2 norm, correlation with random vector and correlation with top
singular vector of covariance matrix of training examples.
Here are the two figures that demonstrate the distribution of adversarial examples and
clean train data distributions in data level and different layers representations of ResNet
neural network. Figure 6.2 demonstrated the l2 norm of data points distribution, the adversarial example generated through Basic Iterative Method (BIM) located in the same
distribution of clean train data at the data level. However, the hidden layers representation level, the model boost strength or weak signal to the adversarial example, which make
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Figure 6.2: BIM Adversarial Examples and Train Data L2 Distributions in Data Level and
Different Layers Representation of ResNet Network

Figure 6.3: DeepFool Adversarial Examples and Train Data L2 Distributions in Data Level
and Different Layers Representation of ResNet Network
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them separable from clean data. Deepfool adversarial examples have similar property in
the various layers representation levels as showed in figure6.3. Two kinds of the adversarial examples have different separation level in the ResNet neural networks. To recognize
the unknown attacks, we need to detect the adversarial example in each layer of DNNs,
because we don’t know which layer representation statistical signature is the strongest to
separate the adversarial example.

6.2.2

Statistical Signature from Learned Representations

In this section, we demonstrate more rigorous intuition about why the statistical signature
of adversarial learned representations may become detectable through the analytical tools.
Though a number of different CNNs methods have been proposed, we focus on a representative convolutional layer proposed by He [129].

Hn = F (x, Wi ) + x

(6.2)

The Hn and x are the output vector and input data of the hidden layers are considered. The neural network map the data to representation through function F (x, Wi ). The
operation F (x, Wi ) + x indicate the shortcut element-wise connection of residual block.
This operation could mitigate the gradient vanish problem. The deep learning model could
considerably increase the depth and gain better performance. Another advantage is the
flexibility of deep learning structure, no matter the depth or connection short cut. In our
experiment, we also consider detecting adversarial examples in the transfer learning and
fine-tuning situation. The traditional CNNs operation like 4.3 can form the representation
of transfer learning. As a result, our framework recognizes the different kinds of adversarial examples in various neural network structure. In this work, we applied two statistical
signature in the framework. One is the L2 norm distance to the original point. Another
is the correlation with top singular vector of the covariance matrix of examples. For each
test data point, we calculate the outlier score. If the score beyond a certain threshold, we
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consider it’s an adversarial example.

Outlier Removal Via Statistical Signature
First, we need to calculate the statistical signature of the train dataset. When we apply
well-trained model to the test data, compare the statistical signature between test and train
data. In the representation level, some layers perform well to detect the adversarial examples, while some layers are ineffective. The most commonly utilized matrix norms in the
numerical linear algebra are Frobenius norm [130], the L2 norm defined as followed:
|(f, v)|
v∈L2 (Ω) kvkL2 (Ω)

kf kL2 (Ω) = sup

(6.3)

v6=0

In order to get another statistical signature, we need to calculate the singular value decomposition (SVD) of train dataset representation in each layer. The SVD is a factorization
of matrix which allow to extract representation of matrix. This approach could remove less
important information and reduce the dimension. Define an m ∗ n matrix A with a rank
r, we can find two column orthonormal matrix U , V and a diagonal matrix σ satisfy the
follow equation:

A = |{z}
U × |{z}
Σ × |{z}
VT
|{z}
m×n

m×r

r×r

(6.4)

r×n

The m ∗ n matrix A contain the singualr vectors in V . Consider the v is along the best
fit line in n-dimensional space of A with m points. The projection of ith row of A onto v
is |ai · v|. The best fit line maximizing the sum of length squared of projection |A · v|2 and
minimizing the sum of squared distances of points to the line. The first singular vector v1
of A, also called top egien vector of covariance matrix of A, defined as followed:

v1 = arg max |Av|
|v|=1
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(6.5)

The [131] utilize robust statistic metric, the ai correlation with v1 , to identify the backdoor attack in deep learning models at representation level. We also consider this metrics
in each layer to identify the adversarial examples and it defines as followed:

ρ=

cov(v1 , ai )
σv1 σai

(6.6)

In our experiments, the clean data points L2 norm and correlation with the first singular
vector in the representation level is formed as the approximately normal distribution. The
adversarial example D0 are located in the same distribution of clean train data D in the data
level however the D0 may be separable in some representation level. In other words, we
can apply the outlier detection methods to identify the D0 through the statistical signature
from learned representations.
One method is z-score outlier detection. In this procedure, we calculate the z-score for
each observation in test dataset which may contain the adversarial examples. Any observation’s absolute z-score value greater than 3 is recognized to be an outlier, the forluma of
z-score in this study defined as:

z=

xitest − µtrain
σtrain

(6.7)

This rule of thumb follows the empirical rule which almost all of the data (99.7%) should
be within three standard deviations from the mean.
An other procedure is interquartile range (IQR) rule. We need to obtain the value of first
quartile Q1 and third quartile Q3 which represents a quarter and three-quarters of specific
statistical signature value of train data. The interquartile range is calculated as subtract the
first quartile from the third quartile:

IQR = Q3 − Q1

(6.8)

The any statistical signature value from test data observation is greater than Q3 plus
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1.5*IQR or less than Q1 subtract 1.5*IQR may consider as an outlier or adversarial example. In our experiments, those two outlier detection methods have similar performances
which identify the D0 with a extremely low false positive rate.

6.2.3

Distribution Distance

In order to evaluate then adversarial examples’ sensitivity to different layers in the neural
network, we can measure the distance between two probability distribution D0 and D. We
utilize three distribution distance metric to demonstrate how adversarial example separate
away from clean data in the various hidden layers.

Wasserstein Distance
The wasserstein distance is a method to estimate divergence between two distributions
in the feature space where a distance measurement between single features [132] which
also called earth mover’s distance(EMD). Intuitively understand the procedure, given two
distributions, one can be seen as a mass of earth spread adequately in space, the other as a
collection of holes that need to be filled in that same space. The EMD estimates the least
quantity of work needed to fill the holes with the earth. . The total work equal to all units
transporting distance. The distribution can be a set of representation’s statistical signatures
that follow an approximately normal distribution. The procedure is defined as followed:
Pm Pn
i=1
j=1 fij dij
EM D(Q, W ) = Pm Pn
i=1
j=1 fij

(6.9)

The goal is to find the flow F = |fij | that minimize the total cost overall cost between
the distribution Q and W . This method directly extends the distance between single points
to the distance between distributions. It can apply to the more common or comprehensive
variable-size signatures which allow the partial matches in natural. In some cases, if the
total weights of two signatures are equal, the ground distance is the true metric. When the
ground distance is changed by a norm, utilize the lower bound in retrieval system could
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mitigate the computation cost.

Energy Distance
This procedure evaluate the distance between the distributions [133]. Energy statistics are
functions of distances between observations in metric spaces. The function of the distance
metric between observations is energy statistics. The energy distance evaluates the difference between samples and a hypothesized distribution with equal or not equal dimensions.
If fi and gi are independent random vectors with corresponding cumulative distribution
function F and G. The energy distance between F and G is defined as root of:

0

0

D2 (F, G) = 2Ekfi − gi k − Ekfi − fi k − Ekgi − gi k
0

(6.10)

0

The (fi , fi , gi , gi ) are independent and their corresponding cumulative distribution are
F and G respectfully. Energy distance is a robust mechanism for multivariate analytics.
It can implements arbitrary vectors in subjective dimensions, and the methodology needs
only the mild assumptions.

Distance Metrics in Representations

(a) BIM Adv and Test Data Earth Moving Dis- (b) DeepFool Adv and Test Data Earth Moving
tance to Train Data
Distance to Train Data

Figure 6.4: Adversarial Example and Test Data and Test Data Earth Moving Distribution
Distance to Train Data in Different Layer of ResNet Network
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(a) BIM Adv and Test Data Energy Distance to (b) DeepFool Adv and Test Data Energy Distance
Train Data
to Train Data

Figure 6.5: Adversarial Example and Test Data and Test Data Earth Moving Distribution
Distance to Train Data in Different Layer of ResNet Network
The figure 6.4 and 6.5a present the data distribution distances change over the hidden
layers representations. The results of two metrics are consistent in BIM and Deepfool
adversarial examples. The BIM examples are separable at the beginning part and ending
part of ResNet structure. The DeepFool examples are only separable at beginning part. It’s
hard to know which layer’s representation is good for an unknown adversarial example, so
our framework designed to recognize the adversarial example in each layer of DNNs.

6.2.4

Proposed Adversarial Example Detection Framework

We proposed two frameworks to detect the adversarial example in each hidden layer: Generalized Statistical Signature Adversarial detection and Conditional Statistical Signature
adversarial detection. The figure 6.6 illustrated the pipline. We first train the deep neural
network on clean train data. In the generalized approach 6, we extract a learned train data
representation for each hidden layer. Then calculate the statistical signatures introduced in
6.2.2 of train data and utilize them to compute the outlier score for test data which may
contain the adversarial example. In the conditional approach 7, we first get the prediction
result of test data. Then compare the representation statistical signature with the train data
belong to corresponding category. Finally, we can remove the observations that satisfy the
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Generalized or Conditional Analysis Statistical Signature
Remove the Observations Satisfy Certain Condition

Input Layer

Hidden Layers

Conditional

Output Layers

Figure 6.6: Statistical Signature Adversarial Example Detection Framework
certain criterion and consider them as adversarial examples.
Algorithm 6 Statistical Signature Adversarial Example Detection
Require: A pretrained classifier F using clean data Dtrain , an test data may contain adversarial examples Dtest . Extract the statistical signature of representation DitrainR SS
through N hidden layer of F .
Ensure: remove all observations satisfy the outlier detection condition
while n less than N do
in nth layer using the procedures in 6.2.2.
Calculated the statistical signature of dtest
i
Compare the representation statistical signature of dtest
with train data representation
i
trainR SS
statistical signature Dn
Remove the observation dtest
if satisfy the outlier detection condition in 6.2.2
i
end while
Here, we consider the Dtrain is clean data without adversarial examples and the trained
classifier F could predict the clean test data with high performance. At the high level,
the two approach could detect the adversarial examples in hidden layers, however it’s hard
to identify which layer is effective or which the deep learning structure could build better
defense barriers. In practice, we can apply this light computation cost method to any deep
learning structures.
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Algorithm 7 Conditional Statistical Signature Adversarial Example Detection
Require: A pretrained classifier F using clean data Dtrain with corresponding k categories, an test data may contain adversarial examples Dtest . Run the test data Dtest on
classifier F , each observation has predicted result: category ki .Extract the statistical signature of representation DitrainR SS through N hidden layer of F for each ki category
respectively.
Ensure: remove all observations satisfy the outlier detection condition in each category
respectively
while n less than N do
Calculated the statistical signature of dtest
in nth layer using the procedures in 6.2.2.
i
Compare the representation statistical signature of dtest
with train data representation
i
statistical signature DntrainR SS of corresponding category.
if satisfy the outlier detection condition in 6.2.2
Remove the observation dtest
i
end while
The two approaches also indicate the neural network ”know” the adversarial examples
although the final prediction is ”misclassification”. Intuitively, there are two objectives
of adversarial examples: small perturbation size and fool the target model. The statistic
signature of D and D0 are hard to distinguish in the data level. And most state-of-the-art
adversarial example only design to fool the final prediction result. So the hidden layers
could be aware of the abnormal data distribution of representation feature. It is also our
initial motivation to construct this framework as an barrier to adversarial examples and improve the model robustness. To attack proposed defensive framework, the attack algorithm
need to fool the each hidden layer in the target model which increase the complexity and
computation cost significantly.

6.3
6.3.1

Experiments
Setup

In our experiments, we study the properties of adversarial examples on CIFAR 10 dataset
[134]. We test our defense strategy in two model:the ResNet deep learning model and
transfer learning a pre-trained VGG model. To generate the adversarial examples we utilized the python 3 Adversarial Robustness Toolbox [135]. The different layers in the model
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form various representations, usually the top layers treat as ”high level”. In our experiments
show that, the defense framework detect the adversarial examples more efficient in the ”low
level” representations. In the transfer learning approach, we evaluate our framework on two
models based on pre-trained VGG 16 model on Imagenet Dataset [136]. One is fine-tuning
which add two layers on high level representation and do not retrained the VGG parameters. Another model is set to retrain the VGG parameters with two layers to the top of
pre-trained model.

6.3.2

Attacks and Defenses Approaches

We evaluate the defense framework by using three kinds of state-of-the-art adversarial examples: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [86], DeepFool [53], and C&W [54]. Based on
the discussion in the 5, the three adversarial examples can be classified in on their attack
strength level: BIM-low, Deepfool-medium, C&W-high. In the [54], the author claimed
that the C&W could defeat most adversarial defense framework through modified the corresponding cost function in the C&W attack algorithm. In our experiments, we choose
the 32·32 color CIFAR 10 dataset which contain 60000 data observations of 10 categories.
We trained the CIFAR data on 3-blocks size ResNet neural network and reach the classification accuruacy 93.42%. Then generate the three types of adversarial examples based
on the gradient information of trained ResNet and for each type we have 1000 adversarial
examples.

6.3.3

Evaluate the Defense Framework

In this section, we show the performance of our defense framework based on various statistical signature and outlier detection metrics in proposed general and conditional detection
framework. In the detection metrics, we utilize statistical signature from the clean train
dataset, then compare the test dataset statistical signature with the clean train dataset. We
also evaluate the false positive cases which identify the clean test data as the adversarial
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examples and test the results in different settings of Z-Score detection method.

General Detection
The figure 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 present the proposed defense framework’s performance in each
hidden layer of neural network. In general, the Z-Score and IQR detection methods have
similar performance. In the default setting, the Z-Score detector identified the data observations of three standard deviations away from mean and the IQR detector recognized the data
observations higher than 1.5 times IQR. Based on the perturbation size and attack strength,
the advanced attack algorithm generates less detectable adversarial examples. And the
L2 norm is a better evaluation statistical signature comparing to the correlation with top
eigen(singular) vector of the covariance matrix.
BIM examples could be easily detect in various layers representations. All the BIM
examples can be identified through our proposed model. The Deepfool can be detected
in the ”low level” features but hard to find in the ”high level” features. The ”Strongest”
C&W adversarial examples are barely detect in all hidden layers except the flatten layers.
In addition, some adversarial example cannot be recognition in one layer’s representation
but they may be detected in other layers’ representation. Aggregate all the layers detection
results should be a good strategy and the statistical signatures do not consume too much
computation power.
Besides the adversarial examples detection, the false positive rate is another important
evaluation metrics of proposed defense framework. As the figure 6.10 shows, the false
positive rate is extremely low except the representation of last layer. This indicate we need
to tune the parameters of detector and set a more strictly standard to mitigate the negative
effective on clean test data.
The table 6.1 demonstrate the different performance under 2.5, 3 and 4 standard deviation setting of Z-Score detector. It means the statistical signature value greater than 2.5, 3
or 4 could be the adversarial examples. As the result, even with the strict standard setting,
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(a) BIM Adv L2 Detection In Different Layers Of (b) BIM Adv Top Eigen Detection In Different
Layers Of ResNeta
ResNet

Figure 6.7: Detect the BIM Adversarial Example Using two Different Statistical Signature
Metrics in each Layer of ResNet Nerual Network

(a) DeepFool Adv L2 Detection In Different Lay- (b) DeepFool Adv Top Eigen Detection In Differers Of ResNet
ent Layers Of ResNet

Figure 6.8: Detect the DeepFool Adversarial Example Using two Different Statistical Signature Metrics in each Layer of ResNet Nerual Network
4 standard deviation, the Z-Score detector still filter out the substantial adversarial examples with a very low false positive rate, decrease from 28.3% to 6.5% and 33.4% to 2.3%
in two corresponding statistical signature. However the detection rate doesn’t affect too
much. The BIM detection rate keep the same in L2 and correlation with Top Eigen vector
metrics. The DeepFool L2 signature detection rate decreased from 85.2% to 77/7% and the
correlation with top eigen vector signature detection rate decrease from 76.0% to 59.4%.
Comparing the effective of two statics metric, the L2 statistical signature is more useful
in adversarial example detection. The correlation with top eigen vector signature barely
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(a) C&W Adv L2 Detection In Different Layers (b) C&W Adv Top Eigen Detection In Different
Of ResNet
Layers Of ResNet

Figure 6.9: Detect the C&W Adversarial Example Using two Different Statistical Signature
Metrics in each Layer of ResNet Nerual Network

(a) False Positive Rate of L2 Detection In Differ- (b) False Positive Rate of Top Eigen Detection In
ent Layers Of ResNet
Different Layers Of ResNet

Figure 6.10: False Positive Rate of Using two Different Statistical Signature Metrics in
each Layer of ResNet Nerual Network
reflect the feature of C&W adversarial examples.
Overall the general detection framework could identified the unknown adversarial example very well without heavy extra computation and outperform other state-of-the art
adversarial defense model performance in 6.3.4.

Conditional Detection
In the conditional detection framework, we first get the prediction result of each observation
and detect the adversarial example in each category. One interesting thing is the detection
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Z-Score Detection
BIM L2
DeepFool L2
C&W L2
False Positive L2
BIM Top Eigen
DeepFool Top Eigen
C&W Top Eigen
False Positive Top Eigen

2.5 Std
100%
85.2%
65.9%
28.3%
100%
76.0%
35.6%
33.4%

3 Std
100%
81.6%
57.5%
16.2%
100.0%
68.9%
16.3%
11.3%

4 Std
100%
77.7%
42.7%
6.5%
100%
59.4%
4.9%
2.3%

Table 6.1: Z-Score Detection Accuracy with Different Scalar of Std
performance in some categories are significant better than others. The ship adversarial
examples are easy to recognize and the deer adversarial examples are hard to identify.
The overall performance is slightly worse than the general detection approach. The L2
statistical signature performed better than top eigen vector statistical signature which is
consistent with the general detection approach.
The figure 6.11 is the Z-Score detection method of C%W ship adversarial examples
in each hidden layers. And the detection patterns is also consistent with general detection
approach like figure 6.9. The detection rate is poor in the ”low level” and recognize well in
the ”high level”.

(a) Ship C&W Adv L2 Detection In Different (b) Ship C&W Adv Top Eigen Detection In DifLayers Of ResNet
ferent Layers Of ResNet

Figure 6.11: Ship C&W Adversarial Example Detection Using two Different Statistical
Signature Metrics in each Layer of ResNet Nerual Network
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6.3.4

Comparing with Other Defense Methods

In this subsection, we comparing our proposed method with other state-of-the-art adversarial defense framework. The [137] proposed a automatic architecture search robust neural
networks to defend adversarial attacks. The author utilize a genetic algorithm improve the
robustness of network in each iteration. The architecture could evolve to be inherently accurate on adversarial samples. The [138] propose the Gaussian data augmentation method
to improve the robustness of prediction. The [66] propose the feature squeezing and spatial smoothing to transfer the data to enhance the DNNs ability to against the adversarial
examples.
The table 6.3 shows the four defense strategy prediction accuracy on adversarial dataset.
If we don’t have these defensive methods, the classifier prediction on clean test data is
93.4% and 0.0% on adversarial examples. Note that, comparing with your proposed method,
we focus on light computation methods. So we only utilize the Gaussian Augmentation,
Spatial Smoothing, and Feature Squeezing as denoise transformer to remove the perturbation effects to our classifier. Ad the result, the these defense processor perform worse
than our proposed method. The interesting thing is that these framework defense better for
the strong adversarial example (C&W) but perform relative poor in the ”weak” adversarial
example. The ensemble method doesn’t work well, and the spatial smoothing significantly
increase the prediction accuracy in for DeepFool and C&W examples. Various kinds of
adversarial example have different property, it’s hard to determine which defense method
is best for the target classifier.

6.4

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, we demonstrate the notion of statistical signature and how they can be used
in detecting the various adversarial attacks. The defense framework relied on the learned
representation in each layer of the classifier to boost signals to classification. When the
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adversarial example mixed in the clean dataset, the hidden layers’ representation amplifies
the statistical signatures to the adversarial example, which makes them separable among
clean data through the outlier detector.
The proposed defense framework implement in CIFAR 10 image identification task and
do an excellent performance to detect adversarial examples as outliers of clean data. We
provide distribution distance of clean test data and adversarial examples in each hidden
layer representation level. In some layers, the adversarial example representations’ statistical signal shifts the distribution enough to be detected with detection methods. Moreover,
we also demonstrate that it’s necessary to extract the representation from each layer; the
detection rate is various in each layer. Some adversarial examples cannot be detected in
some hidden layers but possibly be recognized in other layers. In addition, the different
kinds of adversarial examples are not have same boosted strength signal in each layer. And
the general detection approach performed better than the conditional detection approach,
the L2 distance to original point is a good metric to identify the adversarial examples.
Overall, we consider the robustness of the deep learning model is crucial in many applications. It’s important to study how adversarial examples affect the classifier’s robustness.
This chapter demonstrates the utilization of statistical signature, and the hidden layer representation can build a barrier to adversarial examples in an efficient way.
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Table 6.2: Z-Score Conditional Detection
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Z-Score Detection
BIM L2
DeepFool L2
C&W L2
False Positive L2
BIM Top Eigen
DeepFool Top Eigen
C&W Top Eigen
False Positive Top Eigen

Airplane
100%
64.7%
41.3%
6.5%
100%
45.1%
20.6%
5.6%

Automobile
100%
62.5%
63.3%
6.9%
100.0%
40.6%
25.0%
5.4%

Bird
100%
73.3%
66.0%
6.1%
100%
26.7%
8.0%
9.8%

Cat
100%
77.6%
64.2%
5.4%
100%
56.4%
37.9%
7.4%

Deer
100%
15.2%
9.2%
16.5%
100%
15.2%
4.6%
3.2%

Dog
100%
42.8%
34.8%
10.0%
100%
11.4%
6.2%
4.7%

Frog
100%
25.3%
12.4%
15.2%
100%
24.1%
7.3%
2.8%

Horse
100%
61.8%
34.7%
11.8%
100%
26.3%
4.9%
10.3%

Ship
100%
96.9%
70.5%
2.1%
100%
95.9%
44.9%
5.7%

Truck
100%
87.5%
52.7%
8.2%
100%
75.6%
18.2%
9.7%

Total
100%
60.8%
44.9%
8.9%
100%
41.7%
17.8%
6.5%

Defense Method
Defensive Network
Gaussian Augmentation
Spatial Smoothing
Feature Squeezing
Ensemble Transformation

BIM ACC
10.6%
10.0%
0.5%
0.4%
8.9%

DeepFool ACC
10.2%
10.1%
26.3%
9.8%
9.2%

C&W ACC
17.0%
17.2%
38.2%
18.8%
23.2%

Table 6.3: Other Defense Framework Performance
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

In this study, we explore the explore the advanced analytics tools for security problems and
robustness of machine learning algorithm. The data-driven security analytics provide the
solution to prevent the potential threat from cyber communication and abnormal human
activities in the IoT environment. We demonstrate how to utilize the transfer learning
techniques to boost the performance of traditional machine learning models. The traditional
machine learning algorithm could take advantage of high-level representative features, like
logistic regression, SVM, boosting and bagging The proposed framework not only reduced
the data dimension but also discovered the critical nonlinear relationships from the dataset.
The pretrained autoencoder can boost all the classifiers prediction speed and available for
real-time detection. Traditional machine learning algorithms benefit from it to reach the
higher accuracy and recall level on the various dataset.
We also profoundly discuss adversary security in machine learning models. Based
on the current research study, the proposed superpixel gradient attack method and border
gradient attack method outperform the state-of-the-art adversarial target attack algorithms
on the high confidence level. The superpixel attack considers the semantic meaning of the
image, construct the perturbation size combination for the corresponding superpixel during
each iteration. The border attack applied the interactive gradient sign method on the whole
image, including the white border. The perturbation on white space is more robust to infect
the adversarial examples classification. The experimental results are consistent with other
adversarial patch research in which the specific area for the adversarial attack could form a
strong attack.
The objective of adversary research is to improve the robustness of the deep neural network and explore the methodology of deep learning. In the proposed statistical signature
90

general/conditional detection framework detect the adversarial examples with low computation requirement without training extra detecting model. The researchers could follow
the direction to develop the better transfer learning representation and utilize the genetic
algorithm or reinforcement learning to select useful data observations for target task since
not all the original task observations could benefit the target task. This approach utilizes
the statistical signature from clean train data and the representations extracted from each
layer of the deep learning model. Because the attack algorithm always tried to mislead
the prediction results and ignore the effects of hidden layers representations. The hidden
layers boost the statistical signature of adversarial representations, which make adversarial example separable to clean data. If the attacker wants to defeat our proposed defense
framework, the adversarial examples need to fool each hidden layer of the target model.
It’s hard to accomplish for two reasons: 1) if the attacker has full knowledge to target
classifiers, the computation complexity is a problem, and it’s difficult to satisfy the size of
the perturbations constraint. 2) if the attacker could fool the target model, we could train
another substitute deep neural network with a different structure to detect the adversarial
example.
Our research could apply in various applications. In the security analytics apart, our
proposed mothed could improve the accuracy of malware detection or abnormal activity
detection. In many cases, we may lack of enough data observations to train the machine
learning classifiers. The transfer learning could solve the problem and enhance the detection efficiency as our empirical results. In the analytics security part, the adversarial attacks
algorithm still has positive applications. Right now, some counties still restrict free speech
in public or online. The social media systems monitor all the users’ post through artificial
detection models. The adversarial examples could fool the system misclassify the “sensitive” words or images. The adversarial defense frameworks are more meaningful in the
future, as we know, the deep learning models are deployed in so many security-sensitive
application. Many research shows its easy to fool the state-of-the-art facial identification,
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surveillance system and auto-drive system by using some adversarial patch or stickers. The
adversarial examples could easily mislead the classification of the target classifier. Our
proposed defense frame build the barrier of machine learning models to detect adversarial examples. The most important thing is that our proposed defense framework doesn’t
need to know the methodology of adversarial attack algorithms and utilize the natural statistical signatures to identify the adversarial examples. The finding could benefit all deep
learning model deployment, build a barrier to the adversarial examples. Right now, most
researchers don’t utilize the representation to detect adversarial examples. Many current
defensive model are not effective for unknown adversarial examples, however our proposed
framework could detect various kinds of adversarial examples without know their methodology. Following our research findings the future research work could concatenate the
different layers’ feature to improve the detection accuracy and explore more beneficial statistical metrics or combination of the features in various representation. We are optimistic
about the future development of AI security.
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